Health Care

Our Mission
The Minnesota Department of Human Services, working with many others, helps people meet their basic needs so they can live in dignity and achieve their highest potential.

Our Values
- We focus on people, not programs.
- We provide ladders up and safety nets for the people we serve.
- We work in partnership with others; we cannot do it alone.
- We are accountable for results, first to the people we serve, and ultimately to all Minnesotans.

Health Care Services Study:
Findings and Strategies for Savings

Report to the Legislature
January 2005
Cost of completing this report:
Minnesota Statutes, section 3.197, requires the disclosure of the cost of preparing this report.

Report preparation $162,000
(refer to Appendix J for a breakdown of these costs.)

Additional copies
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Alternative formats
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Executive Summary

Nationwide, Medicaid budgets are rapidly eating up a larger portion of state spending. The National Association of State Budget Officers predicted that state Medicaid spending would for the first time surpass spending on elementary and secondary education in FY 2004. While this has not occurred in Minnesota, increases in health care spending in recent years suggest the state is headed in that direction.

A collision of numerous factors has produced unsustainable cost growth in publicly funded health care programs. Spending in Minnesota Health Care Programs (Medical Assistance, General Assistance Medical Care and MinnesotaCare) is projected to increase $1.4 billion from the 2004-05 biennium to $6.567 billion in the 2006-07 biennium.

Like many other states, Minnesota’s short-term solutions have included limiting enrollment, increasing cost sharing, reducing coverage and reducing provider payment rates.

The 2003 Minnesota Legislature sought a longer term solution through a rigorous review of Minnesota Health Care Programs’ (MHCP) comprehensive benefit package. Lawmakers directed the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) to recommend covered services that could be eliminated from the state’s public programs.

Upon further consideration, legislative leaders agreed to expand the scope of the exercise to consider what services should be covered, under what conditions, and how they should be provided. This approach offered greater opportunity to identify strategies that could produce long-term positive impacts on both the budget and program enrollees’ health status.

DHS hired Bailit Health Purchasing, LLC (Bailit) to assist with the study, titled the Health Care Services Study. The 14-month process included research on multiple fronts as well as numerous meetings with stakeholders.

Input was solicited locally from consumers and providers as well as state Medicaid directors and health cost experts across the nation. Some ideas gave rise to contentious discussions.

The strategies resulting from the Health Care Services Study will not be universally embraced. Yet each warrants serious consideration. Many hold significant potential for lowering the trajectory of long-term cost growth. And equally important, these same strategies offer new means for improving program integrity and quality.

The strategies are presented in the report in three categories:

- Three strategies for which DHS has developed implementation plans and savings estimates
• Nine strategies for which DHS has not developed implementation plans or savings estimates, but which hold significant promise for savings
• Additional strategies that could not be fully researched, but which warrant serious consideration for future exploration (see full report for these strategies.)

In some cases, relatively modest initial savings are projected to grow considerably over time.

For the savings determined by DHS, the standard legislative fiscal note process was used. In other instances, the strategy has not been converted to a detailed implementation plan and proposal, including any necessary changes to state law. In these instances, Bailit estimated potential savings based on his research of the issues from a national perspective.

### Strategies for which DHS has Developed Implementation Plans and Savings Estimates

1. **Evidence-based Decision Making for Benefits Coverage Policy**

The question of what services to cover and when is one of increasing interest nationally as greater attention is given to using research to support coverage policy. This approach is commonly referred to as “evidence-based medicine,” defined in recent literature as:

… a set of principles and methods intended to ensure that to the greatest extent possible, medical decisions, guidelines, and other types of policies are based on and consistent with good evidence of effectiveness and benefit.

Research literature is replete with examples of inappropriate service delivery. Certain services that research finds to be effective in specified circumstances are being delivered in situations when the services are not effective.

Minnesota likely spends a significant amount of money, perhaps in the tens of millions of dollars, providing services that are not effective, or are not the most cost-effective option.

The state should implement an integrated approach to evidence-based decision making for benefits coverage policy to reduce these unnecessary expenditures. This approach should include three components: hiring a medical director for benefits policy, creating a Medical Policy Council, and participating in a multi-state Medicaid Evidence-based Practice Center.

Implementing an evidence-based benefits coverage process would require careful deliberation, sufficient resources, and persistence.
DHS estimates net state savings from this approach to be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State fiscal year</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated net state savings (excluding federal funds)</td>
<td>$832,000</td>
<td>$1.9 million</td>
<td>$2.816 million</td>
<td>$3.793 million</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

2. Increase Pharmacy Savings

Minnesota’s fee-for-service Medicaid program experienced double-digit increases in pharmacy costs (net of rebates) during calendar years 2001 through 2003. Minnesota, like other states, has been increasingly aggressive in implementing pharmacy management programs to control costs while continuing to provide clinically appropriate pharmacy coverage.

While important steps have been taken by the state, additional initiatives are possible. Specifically, the state should:

- reduce the reimbursement rate for retail pharmacies
- require beneficiaries with hemophilia to obtain blood factor products through a 340B hemophilia treatment center, and
- contract with specialty pharmacies to be exclusive providers of particular specialty pharmacy drugs.

DHS estimates net state savings from this approach to be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State fiscal year</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated net state savings (excluding federal funds)</td>
<td>$5.3 million</td>
<td>$4.3 million</td>
<td>$4.7 million</td>
<td>$5.1 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The cost savings for the specialty pharmacy initiative would continue to grow as the use of specialty pharmacy drugs increases.

3. Implement Intensive Medical Care Management for the Chronically Ill in Fee-for-Service Medical Assistance

There is a distinct “highest-risk” segment within the population of high-cost Medicaid enrollees. These are typically characterized as individuals at risk of hospitalization within a year’s time. Highest-risk individuals often comprise 1 to 3 percent or less of the total population, but account for up to 25 percent of all acute care costs. Typically, people in this group suffer from more than one chronic medical condition and have confusing psychosocial issues.

Highest-risk enrollees are often not identified through traditional high-cost case management, county case management, or disease management programs because they
are often isolated from the community and disconnected from primary care within the health care system.

The state should contract with an experienced vendor to administer a program that identifies highest-risk individuals and provides intensive outreach and support to them. Research with similar programs for people who have private insurance reveals a savings of three dollars for each dollar invested. Managed care organizations (MCOs) serving Medicaid enrollees in other states also report positive results.

The state should collaborate with contracted MCOs to learn from their experience with similar programs, both to inform the fee-for-service program, and to promote performance improvement across MCOs.

DHS estimates net state savings from this approach to be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State fiscal year</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
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<tr>
<td>Estimated net state savings (excluding federal funds)</td>
<td>Cost of $337,500</td>
<td>$225,000</td>
<td>$225,000</td>
<td>$225,000</td>
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</table>

**Strategies for which DHS has Not Developed Implementation Plans or Savings Estimates, but which Hold Significant Promise for Savings**

1. **Expand Managed Care for People with Disabilities**

An increase in both enrollment and costs attributable to people with disabilities demands that the state rethink how well this population is being served. Between 2000 and 2004, the number of enrollees with disabilities increased 27.6 percent. During the same time period, the relative per capita cost increased 34.2 percent for this population. It is worth noting that these rates of enrollment and cost increases are double that of the elderly population in public programs.

People with disabilities are the only large group that Minnesota exempts from managed care enrollment. Limited research indicates that people with disabilities, including those with physical disabilities, mental illness, or developmental disabilities, can be better and more efficiently served through appropriately designed managed care programs.

The state should begin a multi-year process to transition enrollees with disabilities into managed care. Specifically, beginning January 1, 2007, the state should start providing basic health care (i.e., non-continuing care) to enrollees with disabilities in the metro
counties through a managed care approach. Continuing care services should be phased in at a future date, with possible geographic expansion as well. The program could be delivered through contracted managed care organizations, a state-operated managed care plan, or both. It could be either voluntary or mandatory for enrollees. The state should not require MCO involvement, but focus instead on those MCOs willing to develop the specialty skills and provider networks necessary for serving people with disabilities.

In addition, the state should expand its Minnesota Disability Health Options (MnDHO) program, which currently serves only metro area residents with physical disabilities. The program should be expanded to serve people with other kinds of disabilities and additional geographic areas.

DHS estimates that initial year savings from this strategy would be more than offset by the cost of moving from fee-for-service to capitation, due to the timing of payments. Any savings in future years would be dependent on the ability of the MCOs to manage medical expenses. The Department’s estimates are based on the state’s experience with health care purchasing in Minnesota, as well as the federal requirement that Medicaid capitated payments be actuarially sound.

Bailit estimates that the state could save from 1 to 4 percent after the initial year. His estimates are based on reported rates of saving achieved by other states’ managed care programs for people with disabilities.

2. Improve Training, Oversight and Investigation of the PCA Program

Cost growth in the Personal Care Assistance (PCA) services, both in fee-for-service and managed care, has attracted significant attention. Some stakeholders allege that services are being used inappropriately. In addition, there have been findings of fraud. Overall, concerns pertain to both how people qualify for PCA services and how the benefit is administered.

The state can obtain significant savings from the PCA program through closer oversight and better training.

Specifically, training and program information should be improved for provider agencies and direct care workers, for nurses who perform PCA needs assessments, for physicians who prescribe PCA, and for the enrollees who receive it. The state should improve oversight of the program by enhancing the Department’s capacity to investigate potential fraud and abuse by hiring additional investigative staff, by completing work on the provider registry and developing an improved PCA provider enrollment process that assures better tracking of individuals and agencies providing this service, and developing new provider credentialing requirements.

These cost-savings strategies are designed to preserve the program’s benefits for the thousands of enrollees who depend on PCA as an integral part of their care plan.
3. Help County Health and Human Services Programs Collaborate

The state currently delegates management of service delivery for a large portion of its health care budget to the counties. The need to work with 87 separate counties represents one of the greatest challenges to improved accountability and performance. It also creates considerable demands for counties, and problems of equity for enrollees.

Currently, DHS is able to exercise only limited oversight and control over services and administrative functions that significantly impact enrollee outcomes and state expenditures. The problem is a result of poor structural design that makes it difficult for DHS or the counties to excel.

Increased county collaboration on the delivery of health and human services would be an important first step to improve performance and achieve efficiencies. The state should pursue efforts to help counties collaborate. Ultimately, this may result in regionalization of these functions. The state should work cooperatively with counties and the Association of Minnesota Counties to explore and pursue collaboration opportunities.

4. Improve MCO Contract Management

The state should implement a strategically focused, senior manager-led, contract management approach to working with its MCO vendors. In so doing, the state would create sufficient management systems to ensure accountability for performance that both meets state expectations and continuously improves. In addition, DHS should improve its existing relationship with contracted MCOs that is marked too much by confrontation and conflict, and too little by collaboration and joint problem solving.

DHS has begun implementing a strategically focused contract management approach to work with its MCO vendors, described in the full report. This approach has worked elsewhere in the United States and would support state efforts to maximize the performance of contracted MCO programs.

5. Improve County Partnership and Performance Management

Minnesota counties, to a large degree, manage the $2.465 billion (FY04) continuing care system (with the exception of nursing facility rate setting). Included in this responsibility is the allocation of much of those funds.

While the state and counties have a special partnership relationship, the state should apply some of the same contract management techniques with county entities as suggested above for its relationship with contracted MCOs. The collaboration and possible consolidation of county health and human service functions across counties would make this management process more effective for the state.
6. Pilot and Evaluate Disease Management

The state should pursue a two-pronged approach to evaluate the potential for disease management (DM) to improve quality of care and reduce health care costs associated with chronic illness.

First, the state should implement a DM pilot for the fee-for-service Medical Assistance population, and include a rigorous process for independent program evaluation by a party other than the DM contractor or its affiliates.

Second, the state should work cooperatively with its contracted MCOs to:

- review the varied approaches that vendors have taken to implement DM
- compare those approaches to best practice standards and accreditation standards for DM programs
- review MCO self-evaluations of DM program clinical and cost effectiveness for Medical Assistance enrollees, and
- meet with MCOs to learn first hand their experiences with DM and the Medical Assistance enrollee.

7. Divert and Reduce the Length of Nursing Facility Stays

Building on past work supporting long-term care alternatives for Minnesotans, the state should pilot two strategies designed to further reduce avoidable nursing facility utilization.

The first strategy places county-based Long Term Care Consultants (LTCCs) in hospitals and geriatric clinics to inform consumers and their family members of long-term care alternatives at the point when they are contemplating a nursing facility admission.

The second strategy funds assessment workers and independent care planning for consumers choosing to leave a nursing facility within a set timeframe, e.g., 120 days.

8. Improve County Case Management for the Home and Community-Based Waivers

Stakeholders often cited case management for home and community based waiver services for elderly and people with disabilities as a problematic area with potential for both service improvement and cost savings. The most pressing case management problems stakeholders and DHS staff identified are:

- unclear definitions and standards
- redundancy
- fragmented administration.

To address these issues, a first step towards program improvement should be to pursue the recommendation made in a 2003 DHS report to the Legislature on case management
and promptly define program parameters in clear operational terms that are well understood by state, county, and provider staff, as well as by consumers, their families, and advocacy organizations.

In addition, the state should eliminate duplication of case management services so that the structure of case management is dictated by the consumer’s needs and not by case management financing streams.

Finally, the state should establish and provide training on statewide standards for all case managers, and enforce compliance.

9. Support Efforts to Expand Use and Connectivity of EMRs

There is national consensus that electronic medical records (EMRs) hold great promise for reducing redundancy of testing, eliminating medication errors, preventing adverse medical events, and increasing the efficiency of medical practice in both office and institutional settings.

Minnesota has begun to address this opportunity through the creation of the Minnesota e-Health Initiative. DHS is currently a participant in this Minnesota Department of Health-led effort.

The two agencies should continue to work together, accessing available federal grant funds to support the initiative. In addition, the state should target increasing EMR accessibility for rural practices and clinics and for continuing care providers, and should actively improve and promote connectivity and interoperability with Minnesota providers and among Minnesota providers.

Conclusion

This report identifies a range of strategies to yield additional savings and improve health care program services for program enrollees. The most viable of these strategies have helped form the basis for policy and budget proposals that will be presented to Legislature. Other strategies require more research, development and consultation with stakeholders and can be pursued over time.
Introduction

In 2003, the Minnesota Legislature directed the Department of Human Services (DHS) to conduct a Payment Code Study. Minnesota Laws 2003, First Special Session, chapter 14, article 13C, section 2, subdivision 7, specifically directed DHS to:

“determine the appropriateness of eliminating reimbursement for certain payment codes under medical assistance, general assistance medical care, or MinnesotaCare” and to “examine covered services under the Minnesota health care programs and make suggestions on possible modification of the services covered under the program.”

A report to the Legislature was to identify payment codes, “if any, to be eliminated from the payment system, and estimates of savings to be obtained from this approach.” DHS was concerned that identifying individual payment codes without first exploring underlying issues and processes would result in inappropriate decisions about which covered services should be eliminated.

With legislative leadership’s consent, DHS expanded the scope to address:

- **What** services should the state cover?
- **When** (i.e., under what circumstances) should the state cover specific services?
- **How** should the state provide the services?

To assess these questions, DHS hired Bailit Health Purchasing, LLC (Bailit) to assist with a study, retitled the Health Care Services Study. Bailit had previously assisted with the work of the state’s Long-Term Care Task Force (2000-2002).

To obtain input from many constituents, DHS created a Stakeholder Work Group to make suggestions and to react to draft strategies. Participants included consumers, family members, consumer advocates, providers, health plans, counties, and state agency staff. This group met seven times. In addition, DHS convened an Expert Panel which met four times to provide advice (see Appendix A for a list of Expert Panel members). Finally, DHS sponsored the following:

- three additional meetings to obtain input from consumers and other stakeholders interested in services for people with disabilities
- an additional meeting for further discussion on case management and personal care attendant services, specifically scheduled to obtain input from stakeholders unable to attend regular Stakeholder Work Group meetings
- a meeting with health plan executives to review potential strategies pertaining to medical policy
• with support from The Commonwealth Fund, a meeting of non-Minnesotan health care experts in Boston.

Bailit worked extensively with many DHS staff members to learn about existing problems. (See Appendix F for an example of a working document from a brainstorming meeting with DHS Disability Services Division staff.)

Bailit also conducted extensive research with other states and examined research literature and media reports. From this, he developed a number of white papers, some, but not all, of which led to strategies in this report. (See Appendix G for a sample white paper on selective contracting.)

This report presents strategies derived from the study. The most viable of these strategies have helped form the basis for policy and budget proposals that will be presented to Legislature. Others will be considered for future pursuit. Each of the issues raised in this report, however, is important for Minnesotans to grapple with as they contemplate the future direction of the Minnesota Health Care Programs.

**Background**

Medicaid costs nationally increased faster than any other area of state spending in fiscal year 2003, according to the National Association of State Budget Officers and the National Governors Association. Medicaid costs were expected to consume a greater portion of total state spending than elementary and secondary education for the first time in FY 2004.¹

While Minnesota’s Medicaid spending hasn’t yet become the largest piece of the state budget, projected costs suggest it is heading in that direction. Spending in Minnesota Health Care Programs (MHCP) is projected to increase $1.4 billion from the 2004-05 biennium to $6.567 billion in 2006-07. MHCP includes Medical Assistance (MA), General Assistance Medical Care (GAMC) and MinnesotaCare.

The 2003 Legislature’s directive to conduct the Health Care Services Study came amidst severe budget pressures resulting in decisions to drop coverage for certain populations and specified services, add new cost-sharing requirements for program enrollees, and reduce payment rates to providers.

With health care costs forecast to rise at a rate at least three to five times the Consumer Price Index (CPI), Minnesota can expect to confront increasingly difficult decisions regarding how to provide health services to low-income, needy populations.

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With awareness that there are no easy answers, the strategies presented in this report attempt to reconsider basic assumptions regarding how the state covers services and delivers covered services.

The strategies presented in this report represent only a subset of those that were identified and considered during the course of the study. Most are anticipated to yield savings within the next two fiscal years, while a few are not. Nonetheless, the latter group is included to set the stage for Minnesota to be able to provide care more efficiently and effectively to MHCP enrollees in the future.

There are no strategies that stakeholders will find universally acceptable. However, each of the strategies warrants serious consideration. Some address long-standing issues that the state has been unable to address. Discussions with stakeholders will be necessary to make changes that will improve financial accountability and system performance.

**Examining What to Cover**

The question of what services to cover in publicly funded programs is one of increasing interest nationally as greater attention is given to using research to support coverage policy. This approach is commonly referred to as “evidence-based medicine,” defined in recent literature as:

… a set of principles and methods intended to ensure that to the greatest extent possible, medical decisions, guidelines, and other types of policies are based on and consistent with good evidence of effectiveness and benefit.²

In an era when Minnesota has been compelled to drop effective services from coverage and to drop some population groups, it is appropriate to ask, “Couldn’t we be certain that we are only paying for necessary and effective services?”

A roundtable convened by the California HealthCare Foundation and the health policy journal *Health Affairs* recently concluded:

…in the absence of evidence-based, cost-effective priority setting, the health care system likely will be driven to control inflation through heavy-handed reductions in provider payments and higher consumer cost sharing.³

In public programs for the poor, where cost sharing is a tool of limited use, most states have placed more emphasis on dropping services and coverage. Using evidence-based principles to make coverage decisions can offer the state one alternative to cost sharing.

There are limitations, however, to using scientific evidence to define necessary covered services based on a criterion of effectiveness:

• Existing research indicates that most services are effective with some people on some occasions. Research occasionally, but not often, finds a service to never be effective.

• Many services have never been subject to rigorous scientific review of effectiveness, or even to the level of scrutiny applied to drugs. This is especially true of continuing care services, e.g., personal care assistance, home care, supportive living services.

• Where research has been conducted, it has seldom been performed using subjects like those of the populations served by publicly funded health care programs (e.g., people with physical or developmental disabilities, children,).

• Research findings can change over time as additional evidence accumulates.

Based on the first two points above, research evidence can occasionally be used to identify services that do not warrant coverage based on effectiveness (e.g., bone marrow transplants for treatment of breast cancer4), but it tends to be more useful in identifying the circumstances under which a service could or could not be covered. The third point instructs policymakers to be mindful when applying research evidence that no one will ever be able to know with certainty whether the findings would be replicated with any given subpopulation of public program enrollees. Nonetheless, decisions must be made carefully with the best available information.

Research evidence can be more useful for developing coverage decisions when effectiveness of treatment is considered in conjunction with a cost assessment. This type of analysis is applied regularly to drugs. Drug formularies typically cover the least expensive drug when competing drugs are of equal effectiveness. This approach has not been extended as aggressively to other health services, in part because there is less research evidence available about other services. Like others,5 the state believes evidence-based medicine as an approach to coverage policy merits consideration as a method to responsibly reduce health costs.

Examination **When to Cover**

Research literature is replete with examples of inappropriate service delivery. Certain services that research finds to be effective in specified circumstances are being delivered in circumstances when the services are not effective.

A common example of this is in the use of antibiotics. Antibiotics can be extremely effective with bacterial infections. They have no effectiveness with viral infections, however. Nonetheless, antibiotics are widely prescribed for viral infections.

Evidence-based medicine offers the potential for savings by creating rules that guide when a service can and cannot be delivered. Some of these rules were removed by

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managed care organizations in the late 1990s in reaction to the “managed care backlash.” Consumers don’t like these service coverage rules, perceiving them to impede access to desired care. In a strong labor-tight economy, consumer dissatisfaction was enough to have these rules removed. Now, higher health costs and a less robust economy have led to the reintroduction of these techniques with greater focus and precision than before.⁶,⁷

Systems that require prior authorization of certain services before they can be delivered are believed by some to be effective deterrents of cost growth due to unnecessary service use. They also have some widely accepted shortcomings, including:

- consumers viewing such systems as a barrier to care, even when limited access is warranted.
- providers view such systems as a “hassle factor” that slows care delivery and adds to provider administrative cost.
- insurers must incur additional administrative cost.
- insurers’ failure to conduct periodic reviews of the procedures for which they are requiring prior authorization. Consequently, some procedures continue to be restricted when new evidence shows they no longer need be.

Despite these limitations, evidenced-based systems that control when services prone to overuse are delivered should play an important role in ensuring appropriate state spending. Furthermore, there is a possible role for strategies that direct access to more appropriate service alternatives (e.g., primary care offices instead of hospital emergency departments).

**Examining How to Cover**

The question of how the state should deliver covered services requires a broad consideration of how DHS purchases and manages service delivery.

DHS’ purchasing strategy has two primary components:

- Varying use of managed care and traditional fee-for-service (FFS) systems

Minnesota currently employs a managed care purchasing strategy for non-disabled adults, children and elderly. The state is transitioning to a managed care strategy for the elderly, combining non-institutional services and limited institutional services. With the exception of a small, voluntary program serving people with physical disabilities, the state maintains a traditional FFS system for the diverse range of people who are eligible for Medicaid due to a disability.


• Delegation of select responsibilities to counties

Minnesota’s purchase of most\(^8\) continuing care services for the elderly and for people with disabilities is largely managed in a delegated fashion through the state’s 87 counties. Counties not only assume management responsibilities for some functions, but they fund a portion of expenditures as well.

The state should reconsider these basic strategic approaches to purchasing and evaluate whether and how modifications could improve value, in terms of the cost and quality of services.

The strategies resulting from this study address what, when, and how services might best be purchased and delivered. They were designed to not only provide cost savings to the state, but also to maintain or improve the overall value attained by its purchasing efforts, including the accessibility and quality of services.

\(^{8}\) DHS is beginning to transition Elderly Waiver (EW) services and coverage of 180 days of institutional services into its managed care contracts in SFY05.
Strategies

Many issues, and a lesser but still large number of potential strategies, were considered in the course of this study. Stakeholders, DHS staff, and members of the study’s Expert Panel offered strategy suggestions.

The strategies in this report are organized as follows:

- strategies for which DHS has developed implementation plans and savings estimates
- strategies for which DHS has not developed implementation plans or savings estimates, but which hold significant promise for savings
- additional strategies that could not be fully researched, but which warrant serious consideration for future exploration.

For proposals with savings estimated by DHS, the standard legislative fiscal note processed was used. For the remainder of the proposals, the savings were estimated by Bailit.

Some suggestions were not included in this report because the problems they targeted were not sufficiently pervasive, and/or the strategies were unlikely to produce significant savings (Appendix B).

It should be noted that DHS is currently pursuing a wide range of policy initiatives to achieve savings and improve program performance. Only a few of these initiatives are reflected in some of the strategies in this report. Others are not included here, not because they do not hold promise, but merely that they were not selected as the highest priorities to achieve savings and improve value.

DHS should pursue federal authority, if necessary, to implement any of the resulting strategies.
Strategies for which DHS has Developed Implementation Plans and Savings Estimates

1. Evidence-based Decision Making for Benefits Coverage Policy

Problem Statement
Research shows that many health care services are delivered when not needed and produce no benefit to the patient. Spending on ineffective, inappropriate, or unproven services for Minnesota Health Care Programs (MHCP) enrollees is a poor use of taxpayer resources. They also carry a large opportunity cost – those dollars instead could have been used to cover additional people or to prevent cutting people from existing programs, or to cover other services that have been proven effective.

Using calendar year 2003 MA FFS claims data and managed care organization (MCO) encounter data, Bailit analyzed expenditures for a sample of services identified as overused by some research literature. (See Appendix C for a summary of selective findings.) Bailit then calculated the estimated spending attributed to overuse of these specific services. The research was not specific to Minnesota or to Medicaid populations and Minnesota may have less overuse. Furthermore, the approach did not include actual review of enrollees’ medical charts to assess appropriateness. Nonetheless, the analysis is effective in placing a dollar amount on the range of possible savings by reducing delivery of inappropriate care.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated payments (FFS and managed care) associated with overuse of selected services, CY 03 (includes state and federal funds)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Room Visits</td>
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<td>Coronary Angiography</td>
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<td>Cardiac Catherization</td>
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<td>Upper Gastrointestinal Endoscopy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Knee Surgery for Osteoarthritis</td>
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<td>MRI for Back Pain</td>
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<td>Hysterectomy</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Service</th>
<th>Cost</th>
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<td>Tympanostomy Tubes</td>
<td>381,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pneumonia (Pediatric)</td>
<td>168,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronchitis (Pediatric)</td>
<td>138,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carotid Endarterectomy</td>
<td>137,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 36,993,907</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The few services in the chart above produced no benefit to the enrollee. While they represent a minute percentage of total services paid for by MA, they account for approximately $37 million in spending. Given the large savings associated with a small sampling of services, the potential for considerable savings across all services is great. It is important to note, however, that private payers that have attempted to reduce payment for overused services have met resistance.

Bailit also surveyed the state’s contracted MCOs and outside experts, asking them to identify covered services that they believe are either overused or never appropriate. They generated an additional list of services. (See Appendix D for a list of some of these services, and associated CY03 spending (as opposed to estimates of spending on overuse).)

Payments for unnecessary services can be avoided by making informed coverage decisions based on research evidence. Further, some unproven services can actually be harmful, as the recent recall of Vioxx\(^\text{10}\) demonstrates.

The federal Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) appears to have reached the same conclusion. CMS Administrator Mark McClellan recently said he supports “examining the cost-effectiveness of various treatments to get more value for each Medicare dollar.”\(^\text{11}\) This is all part of a national trend occurring with private insurers and government - both demanding more proof that treatments are effective as a prerequisite for coverage.\(^\text{12}\)

There is one other compelling reason for DHS to establish policy leadership here. Contracted MCOs need to make coverage decisions every day within a broad state framework that often leaves the MCOs with responsibility to operationally define medical necessity. This structure inevitably results in inequitable variation in coverage policy administration. A recent national study found a lack of consistency between how medical directors and regulators define and apply the terms ‘medical necessity’ and ‘coverage.’\(^\text{13}\) It is reasonable to conclude that the same variation exists among the state’s

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contractors and will persist, absent any efforts to facilitate consistency. Some states are beginning to address this problem,\textsuperscript{14} but most have not.

**Strategy**

The state should implement an integrated approach to evidence-based decision making for benefits coverage policy that is much more rigorous than the existing coverage policy function. This approach should include three components: hiring a medical director for benefits policy; creating a Medical Policy Council; and participating in a multi-state effort to establish and direct a Medicaid Evidence-based Practice Center.

The components of the recommended approach are as follows:

1. **Hire a Medical Director.** DHS has been without a physician medical director to provide policy leadership for several years. At present, lay staff at DHS, without the expertise possessed by a physician, make coverage policy decisions. Other coverage decisions are simply legislated, without the benefit of scientific opinion. (Contracted health professionals are available to the department to review case-by-case requests for prior authorization of services.)

   Physician leadership would provide greater clinical rigor to coverage policy development, and would improve the credibility of the function with external stakeholders.

   DHS should hire a physician with expertise in both acute and continuing care to direct the medical policy function for Minnesota Health Care Programs.

   This position is common in other state Medicaid agencies. For example, the medical director of Washington’s Medicaid program has spearheaded efforts to bring evidence-based coverage policy to his state. He has estimated that his medical policy on bariatric surgery for obesity alone has resulted in a savings of $9 million, as well as five fewer deaths related to surgery and 48 fewer severe morbidities.\textsuperscript{15}

   The MHCP medical director would be charged with the following responsibilities:

   - Establish and chair an internal DHS committee to review coverage policy and ensure consistent application across the agency and its contractors. The committee’s purview should include all health services and procedures, including new and existing technology, but excluding pharmacy services. The committee’s role would be to establish coverage criteria for specific services, drawing upon evidence-based resources such

\textsuperscript{14} The Governor of Tennessee has recommended defining medical necessity as items and services “required to diagnose and treat an enrollee’s medical condition, be safe and effective and be the least costly course of treatment adequate to address the medical condition.” (Memphis Commercial Appeal, Aug. 20, 2004)

\textsuperscript{15} Personal communication with Jeff Thompson, MD, Director of Medical Management, Washington State Department of Health and Social Services, July 12, 2004.
as the Institute for Clinical Systems Improvement (ICSI) guidelines, the Community Measurement Project, and other available resources. Representation from DHS’ FFS prior authorization contractor on this committee would ensure clear communications, as medical policy is developed and implemented.

- The medical director also should serve as an ex-officio member of DHS’ existing pharmacy committees (the drug utilization review board and the drug formulary committee) and the Medical Policy Council described below.

To be successful, the medical director would need a clear legislative mandate to perform the assigned role.

2. **Create a Medical Policy Council.** It is important that coverage policy be consistently applied across delivery systems, both managed care and FFS. Executives of some of the MCOs currently serving MHCP enrollees expressed interest in the state asserting more leadership on coverage policy.

The state should establish a Medical Policy Council to discuss medical policy issues with the chief medical officers of contracted MCOs, representatives of the FFS provider community, and the contracted health professionals reviewing prior authorization requests. The MHCP medical director should hold at least eight meetings annually with the Council. The Council should be charged with:

- advising the medical director on coverage policy
- determining how best to ensure consistent application of coverage policy across MHCP programs and contractors.

Subcommittees of the Council, comprised of non-physician health care providers and particular physician specialties, should be convened on an ad hoc basis to assist the Council’s review of policies pertaining to specific services.

Through this forum, the state would show leadership in promoting uniform coverage policies across all programs and delivery systems.

3. **Support and Participate in a New Medicaid Evidence-based Research Collaborative.** Historically, states have not had expert resources to assess the extent to which health services research supports or does not support coverage of specific services. As a result, states have tended to be generous and inclusive regarding medical coverage, and managed care contractors have often followed the state’s lead, particularly for non-acute services.

When Minnesota previously attempted to scrutinize coverage and prior authorization policies, it often met provider and consumer advocate resistance. Powerful and emotional arguments are raised, yet too often these arguments are
ill-supported by fact and research. If decisions made in the public sector are to be fair, maximize value, and maximize health, there is a compelling need for these decisions to be informed by the latest and highest quality research evidence available.

Research is expensive, however. Depending on its scope, a systematic review of the care for a given condition might run more than six figures. Few states have the resources to conduct or commission the amount of research needed to advise all of the difficult decisions they make in their assistance programs.

One solution is collaboration among states willing to pool resources. By sharing the cost, states can increase the amount of research each can obtain while lessening the financial commitment each makes. States also can ensure that research is focused on areas specific to the Medicaid population.

DHS explored the feasibility of obtaining information needed for coverage decisions through an evidence-based policy center in 2004, informally surveying the nation’s Medicaid directors about their interest in doing likewise. Forty-seven states responded positively to the idea. The Center for Evidence-based Policy at the Oregon Health and Science University is now facilitating the creation of a multi-state collaborative. The collaborative should become operational in SFY 2006, with an initial multi-state organizing meeting planned for early 2005.

The collaborative will be modeled on an existing collaborative for drug effectiveness research. At present, 11 states (including Minnesota) and two non-profit organizations are cooperatively financing systematic reviews of the relative effectiveness of drugs within 25 different classes of medications. The collaboration is also organized and staffed by the Center for Evidence-based Policy at the Oregon Health and Science University. DHS estimates that Minnesota already has saved more than $20 million as a result of coverage decisions based on drug effectiveness research obtained through this collaborative, or from DHS’ contractor, First Health Services.

After the initial planning activities for the new collaborative, which will be covered with foundation funding, states will participate on a subscription basis. Minnesota should participate to provide the new medical director function needed evidence to inform coverage policy.

Improved access to and consideration of research could be useful in many areas, including:

- **Decisions to not cover.** The state could elect to not cover new services, or new applications of existing covered services (e.g., using MRI for preventive care full body scans), unless there is adequate research supporting efficacy and benefit.

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• **Decisions to prior authorize.** The state could choose to introduce prior authorization requirements for services that research indicates are frequently delivered inappropriately.

• **Decisions to influence enrollee behavior.** The state could introduce initiatives to modify enrollee care-seeking behavior so as to diminish rates of inappropriate or unnecessary use (e.g., outreach to and education of consumers who repeatedly use hospital emergency rooms for primary care).

Evidence-based decision making for benefits coverage policy addresses what many national experts feel is the most pressing problem in our health care system today – how to limit the delivery of services of unproven value. *Washington Post* columnist Robert Samuelson summarized the issue recently:

> Our medical advances save lives and improve the quality of life. But some spending -- perhaps a lot -- is unneeded. The practical problem, says Drew Altman of the Kaiser Family Foundation, is to find ways of imposing limits on individual patients. This is hard at best, but it requires a political will that's missing.¹⁷

Minnesota will need to be persistent and steadfast if it is to confront growing health care costs in its public programs.

DHS has estimated the following cost and savings in the FFS system:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State fiscal year</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated state savings (excluding federal funds)</td>
<td>$1.034 million</td>
<td>$2.083 million</td>
<td>$2.995 million</td>
<td>$3.972 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated state administrative costs</td>
<td>$202,000</td>
<td>$183,000</td>
<td>$179,000</td>
<td>$179,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated net savings</td>
<td>$832,000</td>
<td>$1.9 million</td>
<td>$2.816 million</td>
<td>$3.793 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The state is paying for services that research has identified as overused. Based on a sample of such expenditures, Bailit concludes that as much as $10 million in state funds annually may be spent in FFS for services that are not appropriate. The DHS estimates above are based on the assumption that if this strategy were implemented, the state would

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save about 10 percent of Bailit’s estimate initially, with the savings growing each year as more services are limited.

Costs include the salaries of the medical director and staff, and the subscription with the evidence-based policy center.

Savings figures do not include any savings that contracted MCOs might realize.

2. Increase Pharmacy Savings

Problem Statement
Pharmacy expenses have been one of the fastest growing costs in Medicaid programs for several years. Minnesota’s FFS Medicaid program experienced double-digit increases in pharmacy costs (net of rebates) during calendar years 2001 through 2003. Minnesota, like other states, has become increasingly aggressive in implementing pharmacy management programs to control costs while continuing to provide clinically appropriate pharmacy coverage.18 While important steps have been taken, additional initiatives are possible.

What steps have been taken to date to control pharmacy expenses?

The state began implementing aggressive pharmacy cost savings initiatives in 2003 in response to a serious budget shortfall. The following measures were implemented in March 2003:

- Reimbursement to pharmacies was reduced, from Average Wholesale Price (AWP) – 9% + $3.65 dispensing fee, to AWP – 14% + $3.65 dispensing fee. The discount was in place for three months, but then decreased to 11.5% percent on July 1, 2003, where it currently stands.

- Several hundred drugs were added to the “maximum allowable cost” list, which establishes very competitive prices for generic drugs that are available from multiple sources.

The state has continued to implement cost-saving programs, most notably:

- Co-payments were implemented Oct. 1, 2003, in the amounts of $1.00 for generic drugs and $3.00 for brand name drugs. There are a few, very specific exceptions to the co-pay requirements.

- Beginning January 2004, prior authorization was required for brand name medications for which generics were available.

- To reduce potential waste, in January 2004, retail pharmacists were no longer allowed to override a “refill too soon” edit, thus requiring enrollees to complete a substantial portion of an existing prescription before having another one refilled.

- Day supply was reduced from 90 days to 34 days, also to reduce potential waste.

- The preferred drug list (PDL) was expanded to 12 categories, and supplemental rebate agreements were signed with several manufacturers.

- Prior authorizations were instituted for drugs subject to over or inappropriate use.

These cost containment activities are in line with actions of other states. Moreover, the state is pursuing, or plans to pursue, the following additional cost saving programs:

- Participate in a multi-state purchasing group to develop consistent Preferred Drug Lists (PDLs) and maximize supplemental reimbursements. CMS granted DHS permission to join this program. Savings are estimated to be $11 million each year or approximately 5 percent of annual state pharmacy expenditures. These savings, however, are likely to be less in the future following implementation of the new Medicare Part D benefit that reduces the scope of Medicaid pharmacy services.

- Within the next few months, increase the number of drug classes controlled by the PDL to 34. This would not only increase supplemental rebates, but could also reduce unit costs by encouraging use of the most cost-effective drug.

- Adopt the new Medicare reimbursement rates for drugs administered in outpatient facilities. This change would eventually reduce reimbursement from AWP – 5% to AWP – 15%.

- Bundle payments of home IV infusion drugs and related services, resulting in a reasonable payment for related services and drugs.

- Develop quantity and trial limits for smoking cessation drugs.

- Implement an aggressive physician education initiative based on best practices and peer-to-peer discussions with regard to behavioral health drug administration and consolidation. This initiative will focus on one of the most frequently prescribed classes of drugs. Based on the experience of another state’s implementation of this strategy, DHS expects to realize a noticeable decline in the cost trend for specified classes of behavioral health drugs as a result of this program.

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Strategies
Within this context, there are a number of new pharmacy management programs to pursue.

1. **Require beneficiaries with hemophilia to obtain blood factor products through a 340B hemophilia treatment center.** Under this strategy, Minnesota would benefit from the lowest factor rates available. The newest factor products, which are biotech drugs, are substantially more costly than traditional factor products, and are fast becoming the first line of treatment. Federally recognized 340B hemophilia treatment centers are able to obtain factor products at substantially discounted, legislatively authorized rates.

   DHS estimates the costs of this strategy to be limited to the cost of staff time, and the state savings to be $340,000 in SFY 2006 and $510,000 in SFY 2007.

   This strategy focuses on obtaining these drugs at the lowest per unit cost. DHS is continuing to implement management programs directed at assuring that the appropriate enrollees receive these treatments.

2. **Contract with specialty pharmacies to be exclusive providers of particular specialty pharmacy drugs.** Under this strategy, Minnesota would take advantage of the increased competition that is developing as the number of specialty pharmacies increases.

   Biotech drugs provide highly effective treatments for diseases, such as rheumatoid arthritis, that previously could only be minimally managed, and new treatment for conditions previously untreatable, such as certain types of cancer. Biotech drugs often cost in excess of ten thousand dollars annually (one drug costs $10,000 per dose), and often must be taken for the duration of the patient’s life. Because of the treatment benefits associated with these drugs, there is interest in the medical profession to expand the range of people receiving these drugs (e.g., using a new asthma drug for patients with mild to moderate asthma, rather than limiting use to patients with severe asthma). The introduction of these drugs and the expanding patient population receiving them or potentially receiving them will mean exponential growth in costs associated with these specialty drugs. Moreover, because these drugs are relatively new, most are single source drugs and few have either competing biotech drug alternatives or “generic” equivalents. This strategy focuses on obtaining these drugs at the lowest per unit cost. DHS is continuing to implement management programs that are directed at assuring that the appropriate beneficiaries receive these treatments.

   DHS estimates the state savings of this strategy to be $133,000 in SFY 2006 and $202,000 in SFY 2007. The cost savings for this initiative would continue to grow as the use of specialty pharmacy drugs increases.
3. **Reduce the reimbursement rate for retail pharmacies to AWP -14% + $3.65 dispensing fee.** With this strategy, DHS would realize significant savings while allowing retail pharmacies to retain a sizable spread between acquisition costs and reimbursement levels.

Minnesota’s discount rate at 11.5% is comparable to neighboring states, but noticeably lower than other Midwestern states. For example, Kansas pays AWP – 13% and a $3.40 dispensing fee for brands. Colorado pays AWP -13.5% for brands and a $4.00 dispensing fee. Illinois pays AWP -12% plus a $3.40 dispensing fee for brands. Furthermore, an August 2001 study by the Office of the Inspector General in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services found the average discount paid by state Medicaid programs (AWP -10.3%) to be too low. The study recommended states increase their discount to more closely match the actual average pharmacy acquisition cost of AWP –17.2%.  

DHS estimates the costs of this strategy to be limited to the cost of staff time, and the savings to be $5 million in SFY 2006 and $3.6 million in SFY 2007.

DHS estimates the combined pharmacy initiatives would produce net state savings of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State fiscal year</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated net state savings (excluding federal funds)</td>
<td>$5.3 million</td>
<td>$4.3 million</td>
<td>$4.7 million</td>
<td>$5.1 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. **Implement Intensive Medical Care Management for the Chronically Ill in Fee–for–Service Medical Assistance**

**Problem Statement**

There is a growing recognition of a distinct highest-risk segment within the population of high-cost enrollees. These highest risk individuals often comprise 1-3 percent or less of the total population, but can generate 25 percent of all acute care health costs. In state fiscal year 2002, 3,631 fee-for-service MA enrollees utilized more than $100,000 in

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20 op. cit., Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, pp. 43-45.
22 Arguments that this comparative analysis is flawed because it does not consider the Minnesota 2 percent wholesale drug distributor tax have their own flaws, since the 2 percent tax is not calculated off of AWP, but off of the pharmacy’s actual acquisition cost (AAC) of purchasing the drug. On average, the AAC is about 17.1 percent less than AWP for brand name drugs, and for generics 40-70 percent less than AWP. So even factoring in the wholesale drug distributor tax, the state still pays more for drugs and a dispensing fee than the Pharmacy Benefit Management Institute reported as the average PBM reimbursement in 2003.
health care services. Typically, people in this sub-population suffer from more than one chronic condition.

These highest risk enrollees are often not identified through traditional high-cost case management, county case management, or disease management programs because they are often isolated from the community and disconnected from the primary care health care system. They frequently have complex co-morbidities and confounding psychosocial issues.

**Strategy**

Opportunities exist to avoid near-term hospitalizations by providing proper medical care management services to these enrollees. These services attend to the interaction between medical and social issues and have been proven to reengage enrollees. This reengagement can result in behavioral changes that can reverse a decline in health status.

The program works as follows: A contracted vendor analyzes claim data, including health and pharmacy claims, to identify through predictive modeling enrollees deemed to be at high risk of hospitalization within 12 months. Enrollees are ranked based on level of risk, and only those at highest risk are targeted for intervention.

Intervention consists of intensive telephonic and in-person outreach and support by skilled clinical staff. Attempts are sometimes made to contact enrollees who lack a telephone. There is typically a high voluntary engagement rate when individuals are contacted. The outreach focuses on both medical self-management issues and on social issues such as isolation, depression, or substance abuse, which may directly impact the enrollee’s ability to manage their chronic medical condition(s).

An independent assessment by Milliman and Robertson of predictive modeling, coupled with intensive medical care management targeted at the highest risk subpopulation, has documented a return on investment of 3 to 1 in a large commercial health plan. ²⁴

Other research has reported reductions in costs of this highest risk subpopulation by 10-20 percent, with coinciding improvements in functional health status by 10-20 percent. ²⁵

While the cost of this intervention can be considerable, so too can be the savings.

It should be emphasized that not all high-cost populations would be appropriate for this intervention. In addition, the introduction of Medicare Part D may impede efforts to conduct predictive modeling of dual eligibles for whom the state will lack pharmacy data.

- **The state should competitively procure from and contract with an experienced vendor for these services.** The most effective approach may be

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²⁴ Laursen RA, "Re: Outcomes Study for Health Plan X StatusOne Intervention Program" Milliman USA, Nov. 21, 2003.

initially targeting MA FFS enrollees who have been in MA for at least eight months and are not also eligible for Medicare.

- **Customize the program to meet enrollees’ needs.** The state should work with the contracted vendor to develop specific approaches to working with immigrants with limited basic knowledge of the health care system and with people with mental illness who find self-management of chronic conditions especially challenging.

- **The state should collaborate with contracted MCOs to learn from their experience with similar programs, both to inform DHS’ FFS program, and to promote performance improvement across MCOs.** The state should also make available the option for health plans to participate in its contract at the health plan’s cost, if so desired.

DHS estimates the following cost and savings for this strategy:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State fiscal year</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estimated state savings (excluding federal funds)</strong></td>
<td>$562,500</td>
<td>$1.125 million</td>
<td>$1.125 million</td>
<td>$1.125 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estimated state administrative costs</strong></td>
<td>$900,000</td>
<td>$900,000</td>
<td>$900,000</td>
<td>$900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estimated net savings</strong></td>
<td>Cost of $337,500</td>
<td>$225,000</td>
<td>$225,000</td>
<td>$225,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Costs are for the contract with a predictive modeling/intensive medical care management vendor. Costs and savings assume a contract for 500 MA enrollees with complex chronic conditions that put them at risk for emergency room and inpatient services use. Savings assume a 1.5:1 return on investment with a phase-in of the savings in the first year.

Bailit believes that savings would equal more than $4 million per year with implementation across all FFS enrollees with at least three months of eligibility, assuming a return on investment of 2:1.
Strategies for which DHS has Not Developed Implementation Plans or Savings Estimates, but which Hold Significant Promise for Savings

1. Expand Managed Care for People with Disabilities

**Problem Statement**
An increase in both enrollment and costs attributable to people with disabilities demands that the state rethink how well this population is being served. Between 2000 and 2004, the number of enrollees with disabilities increased 27.6 percent. During the same time period, the relative per capita cost increased 34.2 percent for this population. It is worth noting that the enrollment and cost rates of increase are double that of the elderly population in public programs.

People with disabilities are the only large group that Minnesota exempts from managed care enrollment. They are served through the state’s FFS system.

Enrollees describe the FFS system as bureaucratic and non-responsive. It does not provide care coordination to help enrollees manage their way through a fragmented “system.” It lacks a focus on enrollees’ needs.

Many enrollees with disabilities may have unmet needs. Many also don’t receive preventive care or care coordination, both of which can help to prevent emergency room visits, hospitalization, and nursing facility admission.

Minnesota has a small managed care option for adults with physical disabilities. Less than 1/2 percent of MHCP’s estimated 90,000 enrollees with disabilities participate in the demonstration project, Minnesota Disability Health Options (MnDHO). The two-year-old project has been limited to the metro area. While enrollment has grown steadily since its inception, it was serving fewer than 400 people as of December 2004.

**Background**
Evaluations of other states’ programs indicate that people with disabilities, including physical disabilities, mental illness, or developmental disabilities, can be better and more efficiently served through managed care programs. For example:

- An evaluation of the Arizona Medicaid managed care system examined total program experience between 1983 and 1991 and found costs for the SSI disabled

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grew at an annual rate of 6.7 percent compared to 12.3 percent for a traditional Medicaid FFS program.  

- An evaluation of Oklahoma’s managed care programs for special-needs populations examined individuals covered under Heartland Health Plan (2002) and found savings of more than 4 percent in total medical and administrative costs (17 percent when removing the 10 highest-cost individuals), and 61 percent of enrollees said that care was better than under traditional Medicaid FFS. 

- An evaluation of Colorado’s managed care program (2002) found dramatically higher rates of preventive care for people with disabilities in the state’s MCO and state-operated primary care case management programs than in FFS Medicaid for the following measures: cervical cancer screening, breast cancer screening, prostate cancer screening, and preventive visits.  

- An evaluation of MnDHO (2003) found that enrollees were more satisfied with the services they received, felt they received more coordinated and self-directed care, and were more likely to access needed primary care and medical equipment services after enrolling.

See Appendix E for a summary of additional state evaluations regarding managed care and people with disabilities.

States have taken five primary approaches toward serving people with disabilities in managed care plans:

- enrollment in “general purpose” acute care Medicaid managed care plans without specialized capacity to serve people with disabilities (e.g., Colorado, Maryland)
- enrollment in specialty Medicaid acute care managed care plans with specialized capacity to serve people with disabilities (e.g., Community Medical Alliance in Massachusetts, Special Needs Plans in New York, behavioral health “carve-outs” in Massachusetts, Iowa, Nebraska)
- enrollment in state-operated acute care managed care programs with varying degrees of specialized capacity to serve people with disabilities (e.g., Massachusetts, Oklahoma, Vermont)
- enrollment in Medicaid managed care plans responsible separately or together for acute and long-term care services (e.g., Arizona, Texas)

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• enrollment in Medicaid managed care plans responsible for acute and long-term care services with integrated Medicare and Medicaid financing (e.g., Minnesota, Wisconsin)

There is no sufficient body of knowledge to distinguish the comparative effectiveness of these different approaches, although the presence of some degree of specialized capacity to serve people with disabilities is intuitively sensible.

The trend toward expanding managed care for people with disabilities continues. The California legislature is currently considering this step.  

Strategies
Beginning in January 2007, the state should start transitioning enrollees with disabilities from FFS into managed care. This is consistent with the multi-year direction that DHS has been taking with Minnesota’s Health Care Programs and promises improvements in both quality of care and cost management.

Savings resulting from this strategy is dependent on multiple variables. A key factor will be whether the state decides to:

• eliminate its existing FFS system and rely solely on contracted MCOs to serve this population
• establish a state-operated managed care plan by introducing managed care features into the current FFS program
• contract with MCOs to provide managed care for these enrollees or
• implement some combination of the options above.

In addition, the state must decide whether managed care enrollment would be required or voluntary for this population. A voluntary approach might be more attractive to enrollees. It might also make it more difficult to attract managed care vendors due to the uncertain enrollment volume. Bailit estimates that a voluntary approach may not yield significant savings.

A fundamental change in delivery of services to people with disabilities should be approached in phases, as noted below.

Enrollment: The program should start with metropolitan area enrollees, expanding geographically at a later date as appropriate.  

31 Benson C. “Plan targets social services,” Sacramento Bee, Jan. 11, 2005
32 There are a few reasons for beginning with metro counties. There are more providers and more referral resources in the metro area. Analysis in other states suggest that managed care programs in metropolitan areas can be more cost-effective than in rural areas. Finally, more than half of the state’s population lives in this region. This regional rollout approach was successfully used with the state’s Prepaid Medical Assistance Program.
Enrollees should have an incentive to sign up with a contracted MCO, such as the waiver of some or all co-payments. In addition, enrollees should be allowed to opt out of their chosen managed care plan within the first three months.

**Covered Services:** Initially only basic health care should be provided through managed care. Most personal care attendant and private duty nursing services (those provided as a waivered service rather than a state plan service) should be excluded from managed care for at least the first three years.

Stakeholders noted that elderly MA enrollees who receive basic care through MCOs and continuing care from the FFS system face difficulties due to the lack of care coordination inherent in this arrangement. At the same time, stakeholders expressed valid concerns about whether MCOs have demonstrated an ability to meet the continuing care needs of people with disabilities.

Lessons from the current MA experience integrating continuing care services for the elderly into managed care should inform the future transition of continuing care into managed care for people with disabilities.

**Integration with Medicare:** In later years, consideration should be given to integrating Medicare benefits and payments into managed care options. Meanwhile, the state should continue efforts to expand MnDHO. Early research indicates that MnDHO is well received by enrollees, and the contractor reports a significant drop in avoidable hospitalizations among enrollees. While there is still much to be learned, the ability to integrate Medicare and Medicaid funding and to create new care models should be supported in parallel with the introduction of a new, expanded managed care program for people with disabilities. MnDHO is currently expanding from four to seven counties. The program should expand geographically to the extent that interested providers can be identified, and should also be tested with other populations of people with disabilities (e.g., people with developmental disabilities, people with mental illness).

The state’s efforts would dovetail with the new Medicare Advantage program, which makes special provision for special needs plans under Medicare that will focus on serving the dually eligible population only. A recent report concluded that the provision offers a good opportunity to provide an integrated plan that coordinates Medicare and Medicaid services. Many MCOs nationally are pursuing Medicare special needs plan status.

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33 DHS can not require managed care plans to waive co-payments under the state’s federal waiver, but it can successfully encourage them to voluntarily do so, as it has with Minnesota Senior Health Options program.

34 op. cit., Ho.

35 Personal communication with Chris Duff of AXIS Healthcare, July 12, 2004.


**Contracting with vendors:** The state should selectively contract with vendors, including non-MCO organizations if appropriate, that demonstrate the greatest commitment and capability for serving people with disabilities. Selective contracting should accomplish two aims. First, it should ensure that only the most qualified contractors would serve enrollees. Second, it should allow selected contractors to enroll enough people to achieve necessary economies of scale and develop sufficient resources to provide efficient and effective services.

Before soliciting bids, the state should issue a request for information (RFI) to help inform the development process of managed care for people with disabilities.

Some vendors may have interest in serving people with specific characteristics (e.g., adults with mental illness), as was done with the initial MnDHO program for adults with physical disabilities. The state should consider making this option available for potential bidders with specialty expertise.

The state should consider a vendor’s provider network when selecting contractors. Enrollees want to maintain access to providers with whom they hold existing relationships. Special attention should be given to access to dentists and psychologists to which access is reportedly problematic in the current FFS system.

To give MCOs and other organizations an incentive to participate, the state should case-mix adjust payments to reflect the varying needs of the population. Some enrollees with disabilities can require more frequent or expensive care, while others use few, if any, services on an ongoing basis. DHS currently uses Ambulatory Care Groups (ACGs) to risk-adjust payment to MA managed care contractors. The state should consider using the Chronic Illness and Disability Payment System (CDPS) to risk-adjust capitation payments to MCOs serving enrollees with disabilities, as the CDPS is better suited to accurately adjust payment for this population.

The state also should share risk with contractors during the first three years through the use of risk corridors, in which contractors assume almost no risk in the first year, and progressively more risk in following years. This approach has proven effective in multiple states as the states and the contractors gained experience and confidence in serving a new population in managed care and in setting appropriate capitation rates.

**Establishing a state-operated managed care alternative:** The state should opt to offer enrollees an alternative to contracted managed care vendors by integrating managed care features into its existing FFS system. This state-operated managed care alternative would include new clinical strategies such as intensive medical care management for selected enrollees, as well as the use of evidence-based decision making to determine coverage for selected services. It would also utilize alternative purchasing strategies such as a restricted provider network, selective provider contracting, and the use of centers of excellence for particular services.
Bailit questions whether the state could provide a state-operated managed care alternative that can deliver the same level of service at the same cost as what could be done through contracted plans. Many states have concluded that they could not do so. Furthermore, operating an internal and a contracted managed care option simultaneously requires a significant administrative expense. Initial rate-setting for contractors may be difficult due to adverse selection.

To ensure a successful implementation of managed care for people with disabilities, the state should gather early and broad-based advice through public meetings, an RFI process, and the use of an external advisory group. This would help identify potential problems and ensure enrollees’ needs are addressed. The state should work with consumers and providers to design a Request for Proposals (RFP) that would be sensitive to all parties’ concerns. The state should also make use of the knowledge gained through successful managed care programs for people with disabilities in other states.

DHS estimates that initial year savings from this strategy would be more than offset by the cost of moving from FFS to capitation, due to the timing of payments. Any savings in future years would be dependent on the ability of the MCOs to manage medical expenses. DHS estimates are based on the state’s experience with health care purchasing in Minnesota, as well as the federal requirement that Medicaid capitated payments be actuarially sound.

Bailit estimates that the state could save from 1 to 4 percent after the initial year. His estimates are based on reported rates of saving achieved by other states’ managed care programs for people with disabilities.

2. Improve Training, Oversight, and Investigation Processes in the PCA Program

Problem Statement
Expenditure growth in the MA Personal Care Assistance (PCA) state plan benefit has grown rapidly in recent years, both in the FFS system and in the contracted MCOs. Combined PCA state plan and private duty nursing expenditures grew 24 percent between 2002 and 2003, and 17 percent between 2003 and 2004. While these percentages do include both PCA expenditures and Private Duty Nursing expenditures, PCA services are responsible for the overwhelming majority of this growth.

DHS attributes the growth rate to the steady increase in the use of PCAs, as well as an increase in the number of hours used by enrollees who utilize PCA services. In addition, a portion of this increase can be attributed to the eligibility limitations for enrollees seeking care through the waivers.
Contracted MCOs reported spending growth of 47 percent between 2001 and 2002, and 65 percent between 2002 and 2003. This growth was due more to an increase in number of PCA hours provided to their enrollees than to an increase in the number of enrollees utilizing PCA services.

Some DHS staff and an array of external stakeholders, including the Inspector General of the federal Department of Health and Human Services, Minnesota’s legislative auditor and attorney general, and county public health nurses and health plans, allege that PCA services are being used inappropriately with some frequency. Appendix I identifies the recent experience of the DHS Surveillance and Integrity Review unit with PCA investigations. Finally, there have been findings of fraud.

These problems do not call into question the value of the PCA benefit, but only the need to improve its delivery. PCA services play an essential role in supporting MHCP enrollees’ efforts to live and work in their communities. A state plan service since 1977 that currently serves approximately 6000 Minnesotans, PCA improves the quality of life for enrollees, despite problems with reported high PCA turnover rates.38

The state has a tradition of meeting the health care needs of enrollees within their homes or communities, whenever possible. More and more care is being provided in the homes and apartments of enrollees rather than in centralized or institutional type settings. Personal care assistance is one of the benefits that have made this possible. This worthwhile program has saved the state money by keeping individuals out of institutions. However, PCA service options continuously evolve and there has recently been a tremendous increase in MHCP expenditures for personal care services. This the high rate of PCA use means that the presence of even a small amount of inappropriate use represents a significant savings opportunity. That is the focus of this strategy.

**Background**

*Qualifying for the state plan PCA benefit*

Throughout this section the term “state plan benefit” is used. A state plan benefit is one which is available to all MA enrollees, whether or not they are on a waiver program. An MA enrollee who also participates in a waiver program may receive waiver services and state plan services simultaneously.

To qualify for Minnesota’s state plan (non-waiver) PCA benefit, a person must have a medical need for the services. Medical need is determined both through a public health nurse assessment and a doctor’s order. People at any age with any type of disability, including a cognitive disability, may qualify.

PCA services are available through several different mechanisms:

- Any enrollee may request, be assessed, and be authorized to receive PCA services as a state plan service.

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• Enrollees may receive personal care services as part of the MA home care benefit package.
• Enrollees who are eligible for the home and community-based waiver programs may receive PCA services as part of their waivered service plan, either separately or simultaneously with state plan PCA services. The waiver PCA benefit is intended to extend the state plan benefit, i.e., provide additional PCA hours.

Assessing the need for state plan PCA services

The first step to receiving services is for the enrollee to receive a needs assessment by a nurse. Assessments are conducted either by county public health nurses or an MCO nurse\(^39\) for managed care enrollees.

The nurse determines how many units should be authorized on a per-day or per-week basis.\(^40\) The determination is based on an assessment of the complexity of need, number of activities of daily living (ADLs)\(^41\) and instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs)\(^42\) with which the person needs assistance, and an assessment of behavior. The maximum number of PCA units (15 minute increments) per day allowed is usually 14.5. On average, 2-2\(\frac{1}{2}\) hours/day are authorized. On an exceptional basis, a person can be granted 24 hours/day.

If the public health nurse’s assessment determines that PCA services are needed, the nurse explains to the enrollee that a doctor’s order must be obtained for the amount of services recommended. The doctor’s order is required at the outset and then again every 365 days when need must be re-determined. There is currently no standard order form for doctor’s orders for PCA services and doctors frequently use a prescription pad. DHS accepts the amount authorized without confirming that the doctor’s order was obtained, and without DHS clinical review, unless something looks peculiar. DHS sends a letter describing the approved units, or the denial if no units have been approved, to the enrollee. The enrollee has appeal rights if he or she disagrees with the decision.

PCA agencies

The state currently contracts with 619 PCA agencies. Enrollees obtain PCA services in one of three ways.

The first is through a Personal Care Provider Organization (PCPO). The PCPO employs the personal care assistants. Under this option, the enrollee has a limited ability to choose an assistant and set up a schedule. An enrollee can encourage a friend or relative to become a PCPO’s employee and can then request that person to be the enrollee’s PCA.

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\(^39\) Most MCOs contract with private organizations to perform this function in the Metro area. In the outstate areas, the MCOs generally contract with county public health nurses to perform this function.

\(^40\) Some consumers make use of a flexible option in which an annual total dollar amount for PCA is authorized rather than units or days.

\(^41\) ADLs include dressing, grooming, bathing, eating, toileting, transferring, positioning and mobility.

\(^42\) IADLs include meal planning and preparation, managing finances, shopping for food, clothing and other essential items, completing necessary homemaking tasks, communicating by telephone and/or other media, getting around in the community and participating in community activities.
The second way is through PCA Choice, the self-directed option. In this case, an enrollee who has been approved for PCA services identifies a PCA he or she would like to hire. The selected PCA then registers with a PCA Choice organization. The PCA becomes the co-employee of the enrollee and the PCA Choice organization. The PCA provider, the enrollee and the PCA Choice organization sign a joint agreement regarding what will be provided, when, and the rate of pay. The enrollee trains and evaluates their PCA. The PCA Choice organization primarily serves in a fiscal intermediary-payroll capacity. The PCA Choice organization holds the MA provider agreement, collects the PCA’s timesheets and pays them, and bills DHS for the PCA time.

Another option, the Shared Care Option, is available if two or three enrollees choose to share services in the same setting at the same time from the same PCA. This option is not available when the PCA provides services to more than one enrollee in more than one location.

Who are the PCAs?
Virtually anyone can be a PCA. PCAs must be 18 years of age, with limited exceptions for those at least 16, and cannot be a consumer of PCA services. Once an applicant completes the initial paperwork and the criminal background check run by the PCA organization (when required) checks out, the person can be employed. There is no formal training required. It is assumed that the enrollee will train the PCA.

What the PCA state plan benefit covers
PCA services are divided into four broad categories:

- assistance with ADLs,
- assistance with IADLs,
- assistance with health-related functions and redirection, and
- intervention for behavior, which includes observation and monitoring.

Evidence of Fraud in the PCA Program
The tremendous flexibility regarding how the current PCA benefit may be used is one of the reasons that the program has been a success in Minnesota. The state’s current effort to roll out of the Consumer Directed Community Supports option across the waiver programs provides even greater flexibility. While the flexibility offered by the less structured option will be beneficial for many enrollees and their families, it does provide an opportunity for additional abuse by a minority who will take advantage of the flexibility within Minnesota’s PCA programs.

An audit of 100 MA PCA claims conducted in 1998-1999 by the Office of the Inspector General at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services revealed many cases of

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improper reimbursement, and modest levels of fraud. The PCA program has grown significantly since this time period.

According to the Fraud Unit of the state Attorney General’s Office, the PCA program is the most problematic of all of the state’s health care programs in terms of fraud and abuse. Concerns about fraud and abuse have been focused on:

- instances in which PCAs are not providing authorized services to enrollees but are billing for these services, and
- instances in which people may be hiring family members to provide many PCA hours as a way to provide family members with a source of income rather than fulfill a true need.

In the past three years, the Attorney General’s Office has opened 43 docketed cases of PCA fraud. Charges have been filed for 19 of them, and convictions were made for 15. The court ordered restitution paid to the MA program in the amount of $272,060.58. The restitution paid underestimates the total fraudulent paid benefits because the court frequently orders restitution at an amount which is lower than the total amount of fraud for which the person has been convicted.

A recent review by DHS’ Surveillance and Integrity Review Section (SIRS) found that:

- PCA providers accounted for 7 percent of SIRS total case load.
- PCA providers accounted for 22 percent of the cases referred by SIRS to the Attorney General (AG) for civil or administrative action.
- PCA providers accounted for 62 percent of the cases referred by SIRS to the AG’s Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (MFCU) for further criminal investigation and prosecution.
- MFCU’s 2002 annual report indicated that PCA providers accounted for 17 percent of its total case load. It is significant to note that during that year 60 percent of MFCU’s case load related to patient abuse, neglect, and financial exploitation. Cases related to provider billing fraud and theft from public programs accounted for 43 percent of PCA cases.

Examples of Fraud and Abuse in the PCA Program

SIRS identified several examples to illustrate their concerns regarding fraud and abuse in the PCA program.

- SIRS frequently visits agencies asking for physicians’ orders. Some PCPO agencies claim they did not know that this was a requirement and consequently have been providing and billing for PCA service without a physician order.

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44 Personal communication with Deb Peterson, Office of the Attorney General, Fraud Unit, Dec. 1, 2004.
• Other PCA agencies have claimed no knowledge of the requirement that they their PCA employees must have background criminal checks. Again, several agencies did not have the required documentation.

• Agencies are billing from the hours they have been authorized rather than the number of hours actually worked. An example is a PCPO whose payroll service reported 94 RN hours in one quarter, but who billed DHS for 900 RN hours. The PCPO stated they billed DHS that many hours because the service authorization allowed that many hours. They believed that if that many hours were authorized they could bill that many, whether or not the hours were worked.

• SIRS has identified persons who are working at other jobs while at the same time claiming to be providing (billing and being paid for) PCA service.

• Overstating PCA hours worked and not documenting hours are frequent complaints.

• Flexible use hours are being abused. An example: a provider informed SIRS that when he needed more money to pay bills, he billed DHS for more hours under flexible use. He did so not because the client needed more hours but because the provider needed more cash.

• Both PCAs and enrollees have been involved in collusion and/or coercion which resulting in billing the state for hours not actually worked. The extra money was shared between the enrollee and the PCA.

• As an employer, a PCPO should be reporting income and wages to Economic Security, the IRS, and Workers Compensation. SIRS has identified several instances where this is not occurring.

• In some cases, the provider’s documentation is incomplete or missing, preventing an audit trail. Some agencies have no recordkeeping or timekeeping procedures in place. Some have no patient charts indicating treatments given. Others just do not keep any records at all. The number of sites where PCA services are provided and records kept has multiplied exponentially, and these locations are private and more difficult for monitors to access. In addition, most PCA services are provided by unlicensed individuals, including family members of the enrollee, many of whom either choose not to or do not know how to keep accurate records.

• Record review of PCA services delivered is a challenge. Traditionally, monitoring entities rely on the professionalism of licensed entities and their ability to keep good records and to properly bill for services provided. Consumer Directed Community Supports is proving to be especially difficult to monitor. The option provides increased flexibility, and therefore oversight and investigation is more difficult. Often there is not adequate documentation of the care provided through this option.
Additional Factors Identified Which May Contribute to Fraud and Abuse

- There are an increasing number of enrollees whose principal disability is cognitive in nature, such as dementia, psychiatric illness, behavioral diagnoses, brain injury and developmental disability. Some public health nurses reported that they feel “out of their territory,” when doing assessments for enrollees with some cognitive disabilities. As a result, they reported discomfort disagreeing with the requests for service from enrollees or their caregivers.

- Some public health nurses reported experiencing pressure from the enrollee, PCA or PCA agency to increase the number of hours of PCA service authorized for an enrollee. A small number of enrollees believe, or have been led to believe that PCA services are an entitlement. They may feel, for example, that they “deserve” the same amount of PCA services that a neighbor or relative is receiving, regardless of their actual need as determined by the needs assessment process. Since the prohibition on non-responsible family members providing PCA was lifted, more and more family members are providing PCA services. In other situations, the PCA is a friend or roommate of the enrollee. It was clear from the testimony at stakeholder meetings that most PCAs and enrollees would never do anything to increase the chance for approval of services beyond actual need. But concern continues to exist regarding a small minority of cases.

- Once PCA hours are authorized, which is often for a one year period, the request for additional hours can be handled over the phone. As a result, these requests receive less scrutiny than if another face-to-face assessment was conducted.

Strategies for Reducing Incidences of Fraud or Inappropriate Use of the PCA Benefit

1. *Increase training opportunities for public health nurses*
   
   A new training program should be created to ensure that the public health nurses understand how to consistently make level of need determinations for PCA services. The state should hire nurses to participate in the oversight and training process, as part of the activities described under the county partnership and performance management strategy below.

2. *Increase the training opportunities for PCAs*
   
   DHS is concerned that PCA agencies may not properly train their registered PCAs regarding which services are appropriate for a PCA to provide to an enrollee. The DHS provider enrollment unit provides assistance to PCA providers when it is sought, but frequently the problem is related the actual provision of care, and they are not equipped to help with these questions. The state should focus on training opportunities for non-agency employed PCAs, in particular.

3. *Increase the training opportunities for enrollees using PCA services*
   
   Under this strategy, the state should require that anyone interested in hiring a PCA under the self-directed option, or the person acting as the responsible party on his or
her behalf, agree to receive instruction about how to employ a PCA. The state should hire nurses to provide this training.

4. Develop a new enrollment contracting process and establish performance requirements for PCA Agencies

The state should create a new, formal contract process with PCA that includes performance requirements. PCA agencies should be required to demonstrate through a readiness review or certification process that it is ready to effectively provide and administer the PCA benefit. As part of this process, agencies should be informed that they may be audited randomly to ensure that they were adhering to the PCA program policies and procedures. The state should hire qualified staff to develop and implement readiness reviews with new PCA agencies, and conduct random audits.

5. Provide better information to physicians who prescribe PCA services

The state should provide information to primary care physicians and certain specialty providers which clarifies the PCA benefit and the requirements for participation. Training should be made available to physicians on the use of the DHS physician authorization form for PCA services. The state should work with the Minnesota Medical Association to develop an effective education approach. The approach could include targeting physician practice managers through existing forums and meetings.

6. Institute a registry of individual PCAs

As the Office of the Legislative Auditor reported in August 2003, “the claims that the personal care provider organizations submit record the recipient that received the services but not the individual PCA that provided them. Claims for most other MA services include identifying information about the service provider. Thus, the state cannot track and identify aberrant billing patterns of individual PCAs—for example a PCA may bill DHS for more hours than there are in a day or for multiple clients being served during the same time period.”

The department should complete planned work on a PCA registry, and assign unique identification numbers to all individual PCAs. This would allow DHS to monitor the activities of all PCAs, across all provider agencies. This system would be consistent with the way DHS treats all other provider types. The individual PCA identification number would be akin to the “treating provider” number DHS uses to track individual physicians and other providers across clinic, hospital, and office settings. The registry would also support criminal background checks for consumer-directed PCAs. Completion of registration development would be consistent with the response DHS provided to the 2002 federal audit of DHS PCA program.

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7. **Develop new credentialing requirements for PCAs and Agencies**

In 1995, the Legislature mandated that DHS create a task force to make recommendations on home care services (Laws of Minnesota 1995, Chapter 207, Article 6, Section 121). The task force was composed of a broad range of stakeholders, including legislators; consumers with mental illness, physical disabilities and developmental disabilities; advocates; county public health and human services; the Office of the Attorney General; and, the Minnesota Department of Finance. The task force’s report, “Recommendations of the Home Care Services Task Force,” delivered to the 1996 Legislature recommended:

- Require PCPOs to hold a modified class A home care license from the Minnesota Department of Health in order to provide PCA services.
- All PCAs should be required to be registered in a central data base maintained by DHS.

SIRS strongly supports these two recommendations, which have not been implemented to date.

8. **Increase and strengthen the department’s capacity to investigate PCA fraud and abuse**

The current staffing level does not permit DHS to adequately investigate PCA fraud and abuse. Following personnel cuts in 1994, DHS has had only one staff member assigned to PCA fraud. This remains the case despite the rapid growth of the MA and PCA programs during the same period. On a recent day, the sole PCA fraud investigator received 14 calls reporting suspected fraud. Not all leads can be investigated at the current staffing level, reducing the chance that some of the fraud that is occurring will be investigated or prosecuted. Three additional employees should be dedicated to this function.

**Savings**

Regarding strategy #8, DHS estimates that the additional financial recoveries from providers due to an increase in fraud and abuse investigation work would offset additional staff costs. Regarding strategies 1 through 7, potential savings figures have not been completed because the necessary details required for program restructuring have not been developed.

It is important to note that any efforts to improve the integrity of the PCA program should not compromise access to necessary and appropriate PCA services. Current problems with program accountability should not obscure the important benefit that this program delivers to many Minnesota citizens.
3. Help County Health and Human Services Programs Collaborate

Problem Statement
DHS currently delegates MHCP functions regarding most eligibility determination, case management, licensing, contract management, rate negotiation, transportation, service oversight and other functions to the state’s 87 counties. DHS also delegates many functions that are not related to health care programs. Most of the delegated county functions relate to the delivery of continuing care services (i.e., services beyond basic health care such as nursing facility and community-based waivered services) for the elderly and people with disabilities. Continuing care services constitute 49 percent of MA expenditures. They are provided to many of MHCP’s most vulnerable enrollees.

This arrangement does not work well for the state, the counties, or consumers. New and improved models of service delivery should be considered.

Why the current model works poorly for the state
The state, through DHS, is responsible for ensuring that counties effectively, efficiently, and consistently perform the full range of their delegated functions. Unfortunately, it is unable to do so because:

- It lacks sufficient staff to perform ongoing monitoring and management of 87 counties across the scope of delegated functions. Despite honest and sincere efforts by committed agency staff, oversight is inconsistent at best. There are simply too many counties and too few staff dedicated to assess performance and pursue improvement goals.
- It often lacks the leverage, financial or otherwise, to influence changes and improvement in county performance where it fails to comply with state and federal requirements.
- Counties sometimes have interests that compete with those of the state (e.g., economic development) and can make it difficult for the state to have its aims met through its delegated county partners.

As a result, the state is currently able to exercise only limited oversight and control over services and administrative functions that significantly impact consumer outcomes and agency expenditures. The problem is a result of poor structural design that makes it difficult for the state or the counties to excel.

Why the current model works poorly for counties
Research conducted among the general public by the Association of Minnesota Counties (AMC) reveals that the role of counties is little understood. The public does not view county services as priorities, and there is little interest in either tax increases or service
cuts. In the face of fiscal challenges and foreboding forecasts\textsuperscript{47}, counties also struggle with the sometimes ill-defined division of responsibilities between state and county government and the desire of state and federal government for consistent program administration. These challenges are daunting for Minnesota counties, most of which are quite small and which nonetheless are required to meet a long list of state and federal requirements.

The AMC states:

\begin{quote}
The second role of county government is to serve as an administrative arm of the state and federal governments. This role is equally challenging as it is often hard to distinguish where the state or federal mandate begins and where local administrative authority and discretion ends. In addition, a third twist centers on the fact that county government was not made with a cookie cutter and each county has developed unique structures, policies and practices to carry out their mission.\textsuperscript{48}
\end{quote}

A simplified approach to operating services and administrative functions on behalf of the state, while garnering efficiencies, would benefit both counties and the state.

\textbf{Why the current model works poorly for enrollees and providers}

The current system provides services in a manner that does not treat consumers or providers equitably. Providers have testified at study stakeholder meetings as well as in other meetings conducted by DHS regarding current intra-county variation in coverage policy decisions, contracting processes, and rates. This variation is “resulting in significant differences in services available across counties.”\textsuperscript{49} The state is unable to confidently assure enrollees and providers that MA waiver services are reviewed and approved in a consistent manner across counties, nor that service payments are equivalent for the same service across counties. This is not the result of malfeasance on anyone’s part; it is a result of a system whose complexity makes it untenable.

\textbf{Background}

It is difficult to find anyone who would design a system of delegated authority to 87 separate entities if designing “from scratch.” Collaboration among counties would facilitate state oversight and ultimately support accountability. This approach would also provide important economies of scale, especially given the small size of many counties.

Only a minority of the 50 states delegates administration of health and human service programs to counties. At least one state, Mississippi, decided not to delegate to its 82 counties, but elected to regionalize administration of certain state health and human services functions, including waiver outreach, assessment screening, and case management services. Ten regional districts are essentially associations of member


\textsuperscript{49} “Summary of Roundtables on Aging and Long-Term Care: A Series of Regional Discussions with Stakeholders in Minnesota, August 20 – September 8, 200,” Minnesota Department of Human Services
counties and operate as non-profit corporations. They support area-wide governmental planning and management.

Within Minnesota, DHS has supported efforts among counties to work cooperatively for the purpose of service administration for certain program areas. Some current examples include:

- Lincoln, Lyon and Murray counties function as one health and human services administrative unit, having entered into shared services agreements with one another. Martin and Faribault counties have done the same. These efforts were initiated by the participating counties under the direction of a joint human services board comprised of commissioners from the participating counties.

- Other counties, such as Scott and Dakota, have begun to share services.

- County-Based Purchasing Groups currently work together collaboratively under joint powers agreements. Prime West and South Country Health Alliance currently include 10 and nine participating counties, respectively.

- Delegates from the Minnesota Association of County Social Service Administrators (MCSSA) have been working with DHS for two years to design a new model of county/state business processes that improve efficiency, accuracy and customer service across state and county governments. Their proposal includes centralized management of documents and telephone contacts, functions that could be performed outside of the metro area, regionalized or outsourced.

- The AMC is currently considering new models for counties through its *Minnesota County Futures Project*. Multi-county collaborations are being considered, among other potential future directions, as counties struggle with how to deliver quality services in an efficient manner while facing constrained resources.

**Strategies**

Bailit believes that the requirement that the state work with 87 delegated counties represents one of the agency’s largest impediments to improved accountability and performance. Collaboration among counties may be a necessary first step to improve performance and achieve efficiencies. The specific strategy options are as follows:

1. **Facilitate collaboration among counties regarding administration of health and human service functions on a phased basis over five years.** Under this approach, DHS would work with the AMC and from the thinking produced through the *Minnesota County Futures Project* to design collaborative approaches to service delivery and administration. Collaboration might enable counties to combine functions.

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Bailit recommends serious consideration of regionalized delivery of services by collaborating counties in order to reduce the number of entities with which the state must work and to promote economies of scale, equity and consistency of practice. Bailit suggests that administrative services for which efficiencies might be achieved using technology and economies of scale would be regionalized first. Examples of these services include data entry and document management, information and referral services, and maintenance of help desks. Personal face-to-face services would continue to be delivered at the county level, keeping decision making close to the consumer. There would be a plan, however, to transition oversight of local service delivery to the regional offices over time.

More active promotion of collaboration among counties would be beneficial for the following reasons:

- Less active, encouragement and support are unlikely to produce the needed results.
- Only collaboration of counties for all county health and human service functions adequately addresses the profound challenges facing both the state and the counties.
- Most of the county-employed staff involved in direct service provision would be able to retain their jobs, but would work under the direction of regional instead of county authority.

2. **Work with counties to develop core performance standards and performance indicators.** A set of core performance standards and associated statistical indicators would assist state efforts to work with county partners and monitor performance on delegated functions. Some of the building blocks for a performance indicator system are already in place or in development, and include:

- DHS has developed a proposal to include a statewide electronic document management system (described above) with the new automated eligibility system. This provides the tools necessary to assess accuracy and timeliness of eligibility determinations and allows both DHS and county agencies to identify and address best practices and performance issues.

- The state previously adopted benchmarks to measure the "rebalancing" of long-term care within counties as part of the Long-Term Care Task Force’s work. These measures include:
  - the percentage of public long-term care money that goes to nursing homes vs. home and community-based services by county
  - the percentage of low-risk people in nursing homes by county
  - the percentage of higher case mix people who are supported in their own homes/apartments by county
  - the percentage higher case mix in assisted living by county
  - nursing home bed rate/1000 age 65+ by county.

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• Other potential measures should be drawn from existing statute and could, as an example, include the following:
  • the percentage of people with mental retardation or a related condition who receive an evaluation within 60 days of a request for service
  • the percentage of people applying to a county board for case management services who receive a diagnostic assessment within 35 working days of application.

The final body of measures should assess both the quality and the cost/efficiency of the full range of services.

3. **Improve management of, and support to, regional county entities.** The state would need to work with the regional county entities in a manner that promotes accountability, collaboration, and improved performance. Specific staff should be assigned to managing the relationships with the regional county entities. These staff should use the aforementioned core performance standards and performance indicators to identify best practices and opportunities for improvement. The regional entities should be held accountable for effecting improvements, with specific predefined rewards and consequences for performance outcomes. In addition, the state should continue its current practice of providing technical support whenever appropriate and feasible.

4. **Address liability concerns that individual counties may consider.** Counties and their legal counsel reportedly hold concerns about liability that may arise relative to multi-county collaboration. The state should take any necessary and responsible steps to allay such concerns, while maintaining essential consumer protections.

For example, the state could foster cooperative development by forming a liability pool, similar to what the state has developed for family foster care, which would insure any claims against a county cooperative. In addition, the state could work with counties to identify other barriers and/or incentives that might be addressed so as to encourage the development of additional cooperatives.

4. **Improve MCO Contract Management**

**Problem Statement**

Minnesota has made a clear commitment to date to provide most Medicaid services via contracted MCOs. DHS currently contracts with nine MCOs that collectively serve 305,000 PMAP enrollees and another 140,000 MinnesotaCare enrollees for a total of 445,000 people served.\(^{53}\) The MCOs are a mix of large insurers primarily serving the commercially insured population and smaller plans that are Medicaid-focused and, in some cases, county-based.

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Bailit believes that Minnesota’s prepaid MCO program has maintained a level of stability that would be the envy of many other states. The program may, nonetheless, be performing at a sub-optimal level:

- Bailit finds that DHS does not engage in sufficiently active strategic management of its contractors. As a result, Bailit believes that DHS lacks sufficient management systems to ensure accountability for performance that meets purchaser expectations and continuously improves. For example, DHS senior managers should be working with MCO executives on a regular basis as is common in some other states.
- Bailit finds the state-MCO relationship is marked too much by confrontation and conflict, and too little by collaboration and joint problem solving.
- Contracted MCOs are fearful and resentful of state efforts to dictate how the plans should operate.

The tenor of the current relationship between DHS and the MCOs serves neither DHS nor enrollees well. DHS can achieve higher levels of performance on behalf of enrollees and taxpayers by altering its approach to working with MCOs.

**Strategy**

DHS should implement a strategically focused, senior manager-led, contract management approach to working with its MCO vendors. This approach creates a stronger and more effective partnership. It has the following core components:

1. Annual identification of agency purchasing priorities
2. Annual negotiation of approximately six contractual performance improvement goals (and measures) that are aligned with purchasing priorities and reflect clear opportunities for improvement
3. Semi-annual review of contractor performance on the aforementioned goals through half-day meetings involving senior DHS and MCO management
4. Ongoing collaboration throughout the year between DHS and individual MCOs, as well as groups of MCOs, to help advance efforts to address agreed-upon opportunities for improvement
5. Annual review of plan performance across a set of leading statistical performance indicators
6.Annual application of financial and non-financial incentive strategies that are aligned to MCO achievement of agency priorities

This approach has achieved measurable results in other states. Bailit believes that the state will not be able to maximize the value of its purchasing activities if it does not recast its current approach.

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5. Improve County Partnership and Performance Management

Problem Statement

Approximately half of MA expenditures in state fiscal year 2004 -- $2.465 billion -- were for continuing care services for people with disabilities and the elderly. Minnesota counties to a large degree manage the continuing care system (with the exception of nursing facility rate setting), and the allocation of those funds.

The 87 counties contract for these services, determine eligibility, authorize care plans and monitor how care plans are provided.

As discussed earlier in this report, greater collaboration regarding administration of county functions would improve the consistency of service delivery across the state and allow the state to work more effectively with counties to maximize performance.

Yet county collaboration will not ensure closer collaboration between state and county agencies, nor will it ensure greater accountability for county performance. While the state and the counties have a special partnership relationship, the state needs to apply some of the same contract management techniques with county partners that are recommended above for contracted MCOs. In both cases, the state has delegated responsibility for significant agency functions to external organizations. DHS can better manage these relationships to ensure maximum performance that achieves the state’s aims for access to effective services that are provided in the most efficient manner possible.

Strategy

The state should implement a strategically focused contract management approach to working with its county partners. Successful implementation statewide would require some measure of consolidation of functions by counties; otherwise there are simply too many counties and too few agency staff. Absent any move towards consolidation or regionalization, DHS would have to implement this approach selectively, focusing on the most populous counties.

An appropriate contract management approach with a parallel set of components to that described for MCO contract management is defined as follows:

- Annual identification of agency purchasing priorities
- Annual negotiation of approximately six contractual performance improvement goals (and measures) with each regional county entity that are aligned with purchasing priorities and reflect clear opportunities for improvement

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• Semi-annual review of regional county entity performance on the aforementioned goals through half-day meetings involving senior DHS and regional county management
• Ongoing collaboration throughout the year between DHS and the regional county entities, as well as with all of the regional county entities, to help advance efforts to address agreed-upon opportunities for improvement
• Annual review of regional county entity performance across a set of leading statistical performance indicators
• Annual application of financial and non-financial incentive strategies that are aligned with regional county entity achievement of agency priorities.

Improved performance management of both MCO and county relationships warrants state prioritization.

6. Pilot and Evaluate Disease Management

Problem Statement
In the U.S. health care system, most expenditures (70 percent) are associated with a small percentage of the population (10 percent), typically those with chronic or complex medical conditions. This same general phenomenon exists in Medicaid populations. For example, in one state, 10.3 percent of recipients had asthma, diabetes, and/or CHF/heart failure. These recipients accounted for 25 percent of paid claims. In addition, significant research shows that individuals with chronic conditions only sometimes receive care that follows evidence-based treatment guidelines.

Disease management (DM) programs typically identify a population of consumers with one or more of a set of specified chronic conditions for which well-established evidence-based treatment guidelines exist. These programs then attempt to work with consumers to educate them and improve their self-care and compliance with these guidelines. They also may work with physicians to help educate and remind them of best practices for the DM population.

The managed care industry has aggressively pursued DM as a strategy to improve quality and decrease costs. State Medicaid agencies have followed suit, and increasing numbers are contracting with DM firms (e.g., Florida, Washington, Colorado, New Hampshire, Indiana) or requiring that their health plans offer DM programs, as is the case in Minnesota.

While individual DM firms are able to present self-reported savings figures, and many employers and states find DM intuitively appealing, independent research does not yet support its cost effectiveness. A recent report by the Congressional Budget Office found “there is insufficient evidence to conclude that disease management programs can generally reduce overall health spending.”\(^{59}\) This conclusion was primarily based on the paucity of available research, especially for non-commercial populations such as Medicare and Medicaid.

The growing prevalence of chronic illness, the high costs associated with chronic illness, and the well-documented low rates of treatment guideline compliance by physicians and patients alike still suggest cost savings potential for DM, potential that could be confirmed when additional research is available.

**Strategy**

The state should pursue a two-pronged strategy to evaluate the potential for DM to improve quality of care and reduce health care costs associated with chronic illness.

First, the state should pursue its current plans to implement a DM pilot for the fee-for-service MA population that is tailored to a Medicaid population. When so doing, the state should establish a rigorous process for independent evaluation of program effectiveness by a party other than the DM contractor or its affiliates.

Second, the state should cooperatively work with its contracted MCOs to:

- review the varied approaches that vendors have taken to implement DM
- compare those approaches to best practice standards and accreditation standards for DM programs
- review MCO self-evaluations of DM program clinical and cost effectiveness for MA enrollees
- learn first hand of the MCOs’ experience with DM and the MA enrollee.

While contracted MCOs have expressed concern about DHS evaluating their DM programs, doing so in a cooperative fashion is necessary if the state is to learn about the actual efficacy of such programs. Other states, such as Texas, have gone further by requiring formal external evaluations of their MCO’s DM programs.

These assessment efforts, coupled with ongoing monitoring of the research literature, could inform future state strategy with respect to DM.

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7. Divert and Reduce the Length of Nursing Facility Stays

Problem Statement
Despite significant policy efforts in past years, Minnesota remains near the top in the country in terms of filled nursing home beds per capita. The percentage of Minnesota residents age 65 or older residing in a nursing facility exceeds the national average by 39 percent.\(^{60}\) This is a result of Minnesota having more beds per capita, as well as having a higher occupancy rate than the national average.

With annual MA nursing home costs averaging $49,000 in Minnesota,\(^{61}\) it is prudent to consider additional strategies that might help reduce avoidable nursing home utilization.

Minnesota, like other states, has struggled with how to divert people from selecting a nursing facility when they might have another community-based option available to them. In addition, the state has struggled to find effective mechanisms for helping individuals return to the community after a need for post-acute nursing facility services has passed.

Nursing facility stays for most existing community-based MA enrollees are now authorized by the MCOs under 90-day or 180-day liability provisions under Minnesota Senior Care. However, private pay consumers entering nursing facilities and subsequently converting to Medicaid remain a significant challenge to the state. Moreover, this latter group represents the majority of MA nursing facility residents.

Strategies
The state should pilot two strategies designed to reduce avoidable nursing facility use, and consider changes in the current relocation services case management program.

The first strategy is to place county-based Long-Term Care Consultants (LTCCs) in hospitals and geriatric clinics to inform consumers and their family members of long-term care alternatives at the point when they are contemplating a nursing facility admission.

Bailit reports that a few other states (e.g., Indiana, Maryland, Washington, Wisconsin) have attempted to place personnel at hospitals (or dedicate staff who outreach to hospitals), while none, to their knowledge, have targeted geriatric clinics. With the exception of Indiana, states that have targeted hospitals have not reported good success. Some of the barriers included the medical need for discharge to a nursing facility in many cases, and the inability of the consumer or family to emotionally confront a rational review of options at the point of decision-making. Others barriers resulted from failed

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\(^{61}\) Personal communication with Hal Freshley and Gary C. Johnson of DHS, on Nov. 9, 2004.
execution of the function. States often lacked strong relationships with hospital and medical staff to allow for timely identification and referral.

Indiana’s effectiveness appears to result from the fact that it has staff with sole responsibility to outreach to individuals who are Medicaid-eligible and considered in immediate need of nursing facility admission. Indiana state staff have invested considerable energy to ensure that hospitals alert outreach staff, and outreach staff visit qualifying individuals, immediately upon identification. State outreach staff continues to work with those consumers who choose to be admitted to a nursing facility, but express interest in enrollment in the home and community-based waiver program. The state staff will expedite the consumer’s transition into the waiver program.

Minnesota can draw from the experiences of these four states in operationalizing an effective outreach and diversion initiative. This strategy appears worthy of exploration, with a structured evaluation component.

The second strategy is to fund assessment workers and independent care planning for those consumers choosing to leave a nursing facility or subacute hospital unit within a set timeframe, e.g., 120 days. Bailit reports that other states (e.g., Georgia, Indiana, Washington, Wisconsin) have found some success when providing immediate outreach to people who are new admissions to skilled nursing facilities or rehabilitation beds. These other state efforts involved workers meeting and collaborating with the consumer and the nursing facility staff soon after the consumer had been admitted to hasten the discharge process. The state of Washington found that Medicaid-covered nursing facility stays (i.e., the Medicaid nursing facility caseload) decreased from 17,000 to 12,000 between 1995 and 2004 and believes that part of this decrease is attributable to the program. Washington has implemented it statewide.

The third strategy would improve relocation services case management. First, the state should consider whether people eligible for this service could be better served if they were offered a choice of providers. And second, they should be offered information about how to obtain a relocation case manager when admitted to a nursing facility.

8. Improve County Case Management for the Home and Community-Based Waivers

Problem Statement
At the study’s public input meetings, stakeholders cited case management as a problematic area with potential for both service improvement and cost savings. Case management is perceived and defined with confusion and inconsistency both within and outside of DHS. A lack of basic agreement on program objectives and parameters made it difficult to assess the size, significance and scope of the expressed problems.

There are many types of case management provided to publicly funded clients. However, most stakeholder discussion centered on a) case management to targeted populations, and
b) case management for the Home and Community-Based (HCB) waivers (DD, TBI, CADI, CAC,\(^{62}\) and Elderly). Because opportunities for state savings may be greater with HCB waiver program case management, this report’s discussion and suggestions focus on this segment of case management.

The following summarizes identified problems within HCB waiver case management, and the cost implications:

- **Unclear definitions and standards**: This results in unclear expectations for both state staff and consumers, compromised data, uncertain standards for quality assurance and accountability, and diminished capability for enforcement by the state.

- **Redundancy**: Some waiver participants, in addition to the case management they receive under the waiver, receive case management in conjunction with other programs in which they are enrolled. This duplication is costly and wasteful.

- **Large caseload sizes**: Because case managers’ caseloads are high in some counties, case managers cannot manage cases in a proactive manner. As a result, they are unable to help clients anticipate and plan for sometimes costly but avoidable problems.

- **Fragmented administration**: Because the state administers case management by program, standards for quality, data collection, monitoring, reporting and enforcement vary, adding costs and complexity for county staff.

- **Lack of integration of medical and continuing care concerns**: Current county case management programs generally do not integrate prevention and management of chronic care conditions. This responsibility is left to MCOs or FFS acute care providers. Maintaining two types of case management systems, one medical in orientation and the other non-medical in orientation, is inefficient and does not treat the individual as a whole person.

- **Perverse financial incentives**: Some believe there are built-in, perverse incentives that yield inefficiency and ineffectiveness. Counties are paid standard rates that may suffice for what some counties bill as a unit of service, but may be more than sufficient for what others bill for in the same size unit. As one stakeholder noted, case management has become a “cash cow” for these counties.

- **Lack of competition**: Some consumer stakeholders reported their belief that they could get better, more personalized case management and the state could get better value for its case management dollar if counties competed on the open market. Though contracting for case management is not prohibited by law, virtually all case management is provided by county agencies.

\(^{62}\) DD = Developmental Disability, TBI = Traumatic Brain Injury, CADI = Community Alternatives for Disabled Individuals, and CA = Community Alternative Care.
• Consumer-directed case management: Some state staff expressed concern that the lack of a clear, consistent definition, consistent standards, and well defined outcome expectations will make it more difficult for consumers to direct their own case management and for the state to monitor and assess the value of the case management provided.

**Background**

When delivered in its most comprehensive fashion, case management can provide benefits to both consumers and purchasers. These benefits include the accessing and coordination of appropriate, individualized services that improve or maintain a consumer’s functioning. Such services address a multiplicity of needs, including medical, long-term care, residential, social service, and educational.

Delivered appropriately, case management is proactive and pre-emptive. As such, case management can be an important tool facilitating prudent acquisition of services. It facilitates the delivery of lower cost services when they are more appropriate than higher cost alternatives. It also helps the purchaser avoid expensive future service costs through the delivery and coordination of preventive services.

The state’s expenditures on case management are large, and in recent years have been growing at a rapid pace. HCB waiver case management has been the focus of concern for both the Legislature and the state for the past few years. In 2002, the Legislature directed DHS to “study case management …” and report “on strategies that: streamline administration; … improve accountability and the use of performance measures; … and …improve the financing of case management services.”

While the full directive of the legislation had a broader focus than just cost, many of the mandated report’s findings and recommendations have implications for cost savings, beginning with its succinct description of the challenges and opportunities in identifying and recouping cost savings from case management services: “(DHS) currently do(es) not have “one system” of case management for targeted populations and recipients of home and community-based waivers. We have multiple forms of case management authorized under different programs serving more than 100,000 people for whom we are spending hundreds of millions of dollars with little documentation of the value of this particular intervention.”

The report stated that the “key components” of case management are “ongoing assessment, planning, referral, service coordination, monitoring, consultation and advocacy assistance through which multiple service needs of clients are addressed.”

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63 Laws of Minnesota 2002, Chapter 375, Article 2, Section 48
64 Minnesota Department of Human Services Continuing Care Administration, *Case Management in Minnesota: A Report to the Minnesota Legislature, February 2003*, p. 2.
65 Ibid.
It noted that the components are “implemented with considerable variation” across the state. 66

The report outlined a goal and vision for the case management system that, if pursued, might address many of the inefficiencies identified by the Health Care Services Study stakeholders: “The goal of a case management system for … recipients of home and community-based waivers is to improve the accountability and quality of case management services that assist public clients to navigate across the continuum of health and social services and programs and achieve desired outcomes.” 67

Many aspects of the report’s vision have a direct bearing on cost. The vision included “clearly articulated expectations of case management and case managers … standardized reporting mechanisms to track and monitor performance and outcomes for all populations … and the ability to enforce ....” The system would “use administrative resources more efficiently, remove barriers between funding streams, and eliminate “silos” in program administration … and build on elements of best practice across all populations.” 68

Many of the report’s strategies also offered a sound basis for improving the cost effectiveness of HCB waiver case management. These included:

- Establish a clear definition of case management
- Establish common understanding that guides professional responsibilities for case management
- Collect and report appropriate data for tracking and monitoring performance and outcome measures
- Streamline administration
- Establish enforcement mechanisms. 69

Strategies
The high level of disagreement about the basic definition of HCB waiver case management suggests that as a first step towards program improvement, the state should pursue the recommendations outlined in DHS’ 2003 report: Define program parameters in clear operational terms that are well understood by state, county, and provider staff, as well as by consumers, their families, and advocacy organizations.

1. Establish a common agreement among all case managers, county agencies and consumers:
   - define HCB waiver case management
   - establish HCB waiver case management’s goals
   - eliminate duplication of case management services so that the structure of case management is dictated by the consumer’s needs and not by case management financing streams.

66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
2. Based on the definition and goals, establish statewide standards for all case managers to follow in its provision:
   • assure consistency of provision through training of case managers
   • enforce the standards among all providers
   • conduct audits of the provision of HCB waiver case management.

Enacting these strategies would create a sounder, more consistent system on which to build a cost-effective case management system across all HCB waivers, positioning the state to obtain the best value for its case management dollars.

These strategy options do not address all of the problems noted above. The other problems should be addressed once these initial strategy options are pursued and the requisite tasks completed.

9. Support Efforts to Expand Use and Connectivity of EMRs

Problem Statement
There is national consensus that electronic medical records (EMRs) hold great promise for reducing redundancy of testing, eliminating medication errors, preventing adverse medical events, and for increasing the efficiency of medical practice in both office and institutional settings.70 A recent study by the California Health Care Foundation reported that EMR system costs can be recouped through savings within one to two years.71

Despite the promise of EMRs, there remain two significant hurdles to optimizing their use. First, the systems are expensive ($15,000 to $50,000 per physician) and are seldom found in small and rural practice settings, or in clinics and centers serving the poor. Second, the existing EMR systems are not interoperable, thus preventing providers from sharing information with one another.

The federal government has recently assumed a leadership position in these issues. Dr. David Brailer is the federal Department of Health and Human Services’ lead on the initiative, and has called for the development of regional health information networks of linked electronic medical record systems that might some day be connected into a national network. Dr. Brailer calls on health plans and businesses to partner with public agencies to front some of the money that doctors need to purchase such systems.72

In addition, the federal government has begun to address the second issue by pursuing the development of standards for electronic medical records.

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71 Ibid.
**Strategies**

Minnesota has begun to address this opportunity through the creation of the Minnesota e-Health Initiative. DHS is currently participating in this Minnesota Department of Health-led effort.

The two agencies should continue to work together, accessing available federal grant funds to support the initiative. In addition, the state should target:

- increasing EMR accessibility for rural practices and clinics
- promoting connectivity and interoperability among Minnesota providers
- ensuring that providers of continuing care services are included in efforts to expand use of EMRs so that current problems with care coordination across the acute care and continuing care systems are addressed.

All efforts would need to address confidentiality concerns and be HIPAA compliant.

While this initiative would not yield short-term savings, there is strong national agreement that it would improve both the quality and efficiency of care delivery for all.
Strategies that Could Not Be Fully Researched, but which Warrant Serious Consideration for Future Exploration

A few promising strategies were identified in the course of the study, but could not be researched due to limited availability of pressed agency staff or other factors. Some of them warrant serious consideration and further exploration by the state should staff resources become available in the future.

1. Set Rates for Community Continuing Care Services

The state, through DHS, currently delegates rate setting responsibility for the wide range of community-based continuing care services for people with disabilities to the 87 counties. This approach is problematic for at least the following reasons:

- Counties set rates inconsistently such that the same provider routinely gets paid different amounts for the same service in two different counties. This inequity is unfair to both providers and enrollees.

- Small counties seldom have the expertise or the leverage to negotiate rates that are advantageous to the state or the county, and may end up paying more than might be necessary or appropriate. Reportedly some county staff do not even determine required staffing levels, but leave that decision to the provider. The proliferation of for-profit supported living services (SLS) providers suggests that payments may sometimes exceed what is warranted.

While regionalization of county health and human service functions would help to address this problem, there may be benefit in nonetheless creating a central state rate setting function as is common for most other MA services in Minnesota and in other states. Creating a common rate system for the whole state, while still permitting necessary flexibility to respond to varying enrollee needs, is achievable.

The DHS Disability Services Division is currently undertaking a review of the cost and cost structures associated with SLS under home and community-based waivers. This information could be used to inform a new rate system.

2. Encourage Retention of Private Commercial Insurance Coverage

Anecdotally, DHS staff report incidences in which children with disabilities who possess parental health insurance coverage graduate from high school and then drop the commercial coverage, in favor of state coverage. Existing Minnesota state law permits
children with disabilities to continue on parental health insurance policies after graduation from high school under state-regulated insurance plans.

For families with self-insured ERISA plans, the federal COBRA regulations permit continuation of private plans for 36 months when a child is no longer eligible for a parent’s plan. At that point, a child who can’t get coverage on the private market can buy into the Minnesota Comprehensive Health Agency program.

DHS should investigate the frequency with which children with disabilities drop commercial coverage in favor of state coverage, and pursue potential strategies for providing education and/or incentives that will result in increased rates of retention of private commercial insurance coverage. This strategy must take into account the fact that some families would need assistance meeting the high cost of extending their private policies via the COBRA option.
Conclusion

This report identifies a range of strategies to yield additional savings and improve health care program services for program enrollees. The strategies are projected to produce savings that would sustain and grow over time. They are not quick fixes, but rather fundamental changes in how the state covers and purchases services.

The most viable of these strategies have helped form the basis for policy and budget proposals that will be presented to Legislature. Other strategies require more research, development and consultation with stakeholders and can be pursued over time.
Appendix A

Members of DHS’ Health Care Expert Panel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organizational Affiliation, if any</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kathleen Cota</td>
<td>Minnesota Dept. of Human Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steve Eisenberg, MD</td>
<td>independent consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nancy Feldman</td>
<td>UCare Minnesota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karen Gervais</td>
<td>Minnesota Center for Health Care Ethics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pat Irvine, MD</td>
<td>independent consultant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paul Johnson, MD</td>
<td>AXIS Healthcare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Osberg</td>
<td>Minnesota Dept. of Human Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Selstad</td>
<td>Minnesota Dept. of Human Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Judy Soderberg</td>
<td>Fairview MS Achievement Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>Read Sulik, MD</td>
<td>St. Cloud Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom Van Sternberg, MD</td>
<td>Health Partners</td>
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</table>
Appendix B

A Sample of Additional Strategies Suggested by Stakeholders but not Incorporated into this Report

- Develop a mobile crisis team to support assessment and care planning when a consumer is identified as being at the precipice of institutionalization.
- Vary provider payment based on performance.
- Provide consumers with financial incentives to adhere to preventive care guidelines, e.g., influenza vaccine, regular well-care visits, and blood sugar control.
- Consider a “centers of excellence” model for certain procedures or conditions.
- Educate families regarding choices and care planning resources for end-of-life care.
- Modify DHS policy so that immigrants enrolled in Emergency MA do not continue to receive costly institutional care rather than community-based care.
- Maximize use of Medicare for home health services.
- Support expanded housing access to address a barrier to consumers moving out of nursing facilities.
- Privatize county case management.
- Eliminate duplication of case managers for individual enrollees.
- Address inappropriate financial incentives and practice when a provider of day training and rehab also provides transportation and chooses to transport the consumer a longer distance than would otherwise be necessary.
- Create restrictions on how far DHS will cover transportation service to a consumer’s choice of provider in situations in which services deemed comparable by DHS are available in nearer proximity to the consumer’s residence.
- Put counties at partial risk for state expenditures that exceed growth targets.
- Cover falls assessment or more general home safety assessments for senior consumers dwelling within the community.
- Provide presumptive eligibility to seniors who are held up in hospitals awaiting an SSI eligibility evaluation by the State Medical Review Team, and allow them to be discharged to nursing facilities where they can be provided services at a lower cost to DHS.
- Limit the amount of case management provided when homemaker services are the only other service provided.
- Develop clear policy direction regarding when to cover Assisted Living services.
- Enroll remaining seniors into managed care by finding a way to enroll “spend downs.”
- Collaborate more closely with the Medicare Quality Improvement Organization (QIO) to encourage it to address risk factors that impact DHS cost (e.g., fall prevention).
- Remove the requirement that counties contract with every provider and tighten some DHS provider enrollment requirements.
### Appendix C

**Selected Health Services Research Findings Regarding Inappropriate Use of Health Care Services**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample of Overused Health Services</th>
<th>Finding and Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coronary angiography</td>
<td>4% of coronary angiographies were performed for clearly inappropriate reasons, and 20% were equivocal</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Bernstein et. al., 1993, in <em>Crossing the Quality Chasm</em>, Table A-2)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>17% of coronary angiographies were performed for clearly inappropriate reasons in a nationally represented sample of Medicare beneficiaries in 1981</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(RAND Health Services Utilization Study)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MI: Treatment with Lidocaine</td>
<td>The median percentage of patients ineligible for lidocaine who received it in the first 48 hours of hospitalization was 12%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(Soumerai et. al., 1998, in <em>Crossing the Quality Chasm</em>, Table A-2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unstable angina</td>
<td>62% of those for whom calcium blockers were contraindicated received them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Simpson et. al., 1997, in <em>Crossing the Quality Chasm</em>, Table A-2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antibiotic use</td>
<td>In 60% of Kentucky Medicaid encounters for the common cold, patients filled prescriptions for antibiotics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Mainous et. al., 1996, in <em>Crossing the Quality Chasm</em>, Table A-2)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51% of patients diagnosed with a cold were treated with antibiotics</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(Gonzales et. al., 1997, in <em>Crossing the Quality Chasm</em>, Table A-2)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52% of patients diagnosed with a URI were treated with antibiotics</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(Gonzales et. al., 1997, in <em>Crossing the Quality Chasm</em>, Table A-2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Over 70% of patients received antibiotics for pharyngitis (excluding streptococcal), over 50% received them for rhinitis, and over 30% received them for a nonspecific URI, cough, or cold</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(Dowell and Schwartz, 1997, in <em>Crossing the Quality Chasm</em>, Table A-2)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>80% of antibiotics prescribed for acute respiratory tract infections are unnecessary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sample of Overused Health Services</td>
<td>Finding and Source</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Pneumonia                         | 9.4% of pediatric admissions were inappropriate  
(Payne et. al., 1995 in *Crossing the Quality Chasm*, Table A-2) |
| Bronchitis and Asthma              | 4.4% of pediatric admissions were inappropriate  
(Payne et. al., 1995 in *Crossing the Quality Chasm*, Table A-2) |
| Hysterectomy                      | Between 16-30% of hysterectomies performed each year are believed to be unnecessary and complication rates are between 25-50%.  
| Carotid endarterectomy            | Approximately 10% of carotid endarterectomies are inappropriate and another 5% are of questionable benefit.  
32% of carotid endarterectomies were performed for clearly inappropriate reasons in a nationally represented sample of Medicare beneficiaries in 1981 (RAND)  
| Cardiac pacemakers                | 20% of cardiac pacemakers were inserted for clearly inappropriate reasons  
| Upper GI endoscopy                | 17% of upper GI endoscopies were performed for clearly inappropriate reasons in a nationally represented sample of Medicare beneficiaries in 1981  
(Chassin et. al., 1987, RAND Health Services Utilization Study) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample of Overused Health Services</th>
<th>Finding and Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tympanostomy tubes</td>
<td>Nearly 25% of the children who undergo tympanostomy do not need the procedure and another 33% of these procedures provide questionable benefit. (&quot;Reducing the Cost of Poor Quality Health Care&quot; Midwest Business Group on Health, 2003, footnote 136: Kleinman, LC et al 1994. “The Medical Appropriateness Tympanostomy Tubes Proposed for Children Younger than 16 years in the US,” <em>JAMA</em>, see also Chassin <em>JAMA</em> 1998.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthroscopic surgery for treating osteoarthritis</td>
<td>Arthroscopic surgery (arthroscopic lavage or debridement) for treating osteoarthritis of the knee is no better than a placebo for relieving knee pain and improving overall physical function (Moseley JB, O’Malley K, Petersen NJ, et al “A Controlled trial of arthroscopic surgery for osteoarthritis of the knee.” <em>NEJM</em> Jul 11, 2002.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardiac catheterizations</td>
<td>25% of 1,000,000 cardiac catheterizations per year are either inappropriate or of questionable benefit. (Chassin MR 1993 <em>JAMA</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spinal manipulative therapy for low back pain</td>
<td>There is no evidence that spinal manipulative therapy is superior to other standard treatments for patients with acute or chronic low back pain. For patients with acute low-back pain, spinal manipulative therapy was superior only to sham therapy or therapies judged to be ineffective or even harmful. Spinal manipulation had no statistically or clinically significant advantage over general practitioner care, physical therapy, exercises, or back school (Assendelft W, et al. “Spinal manipulative therapy for low back pain” Department of Guideline Development and Research Policy, Dutch College of General Practitioners. Netherlands. (Meta analysis of 39 randomized controlled trials.))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRIs for back pain</td>
<td>Patients with back pain referred for an MRI, instead of an X-ray, ended up with more intensive treatment – more doctor visits, more physical therapy, acupuncture and chiropractic manipulations, as well as more surgery. Yet these patients were no better than the X-ray patients (Jarvik JK et al, “Rapid Magnetic Resonance Imaging Versus Radiographs for Patients with Low Back Pain.” <em>JAMA</em> 2003.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgical explorations for suspected appendicitis</td>
<td>40% of surgical explorations for suspected appendicitis are unnecessary (World Journal of Surgery, Feb. 1999, Vol. 23, No 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample of Overused Health Services</td>
<td>Finding and Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency department use</td>
<td>20% of patients coming to the ED did not have conditions requiring emergency care, and another 20% had urgent conditions that could have been treated in a primary care setting” \ (Regenstein M et al, “Walking a Tightrope: The State of the Safety Net in 10 U.S. Communities.” The George Washington University Medical Center, May 2004.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D

Sample of Services Identified by Minnesota MCOs and Other Advisors to DHS as Subject to Inappropriate Use

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Total MA Payments (FFS and managed care)</th>
<th>CY 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acupuncture</td>
<td></td>
<td>$171,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleep Testing</td>
<td></td>
<td>$1,867,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fetal Ultrasounds</td>
<td></td>
<td>$845,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obstetrical Ultrasounds</td>
<td></td>
<td>$6,550,741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVIG(^{73})</td>
<td></td>
<td>$1,982,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyperhydrosis Report</td>
<td></td>
<td>$244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panniculectomy</td>
<td></td>
<td>$121,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mammoplasty</td>
<td></td>
<td>$1,146,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhinoplasty</td>
<td></td>
<td>$5,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bariatric Surgery for Obesity</td>
<td></td>
<td>$4,754,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vision Therapy</td>
<td></td>
<td>$13,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duplicate Glasses</td>
<td></td>
<td>$2,964,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Wheelchair in LTC Facility</td>
<td></td>
<td>$257,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seasonal Affective Disorder Lights</td>
<td></td>
<td>$20,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ultrasonic Bone Growth Stimulations</td>
<td></td>
<td>$458,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laser Treatment for Acne Scarring</td>
<td></td>
<td>$173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spinal Fusion</td>
<td></td>
<td>$12,477,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varicose Vein Treatment</td>
<td></td>
<td>$173,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Vessel Coronary Artery Bypass Graft</td>
<td></td>
<td>$513,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swanz-Ganz Catheter</td>
<td></td>
<td>$141,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Uterine Monitoring</td>
<td></td>
<td>$25,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary Angioplasty</td>
<td></td>
<td>$9,480,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dental Implants</td>
<td></td>
<td>$116,175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{73}\) Intravenous immunoglobulin therapy
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orthodontia</td>
<td>$9,940,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational Therapy/Physical Therapy for LTC Residents</td>
<td>$3,606,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech Therapy for LTC Residents</td>
<td>$354,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audiology for LTC Residents</td>
<td>$189,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$58,178,466</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** These are not savings estimates, but rather total expenditures for services that are alleged to be prone to overuse.
Appendix E

Additional Evidence of the Effectiveness of Medicaid Managed Care for People with Disabilities

• An evaluation of Texas’ STAR+PLUS program (2003)\textsuperscript{74} which includes both acute and continuing care services in the HMO capitation rate found that
  o adult SSI disabled recipients, when compared to those recipients enrolled in HMOs without continuing care services in the capitation:
    ▪ used ERs 38% less often and were admitted to hospitals 22% less often, and
    ▪ cost 74% less, with the most significant savings among those with the worst health status.

• A qualitative evaluation of Medicaid managed care for adults with disabilities in California (2002)\textsuperscript{75} found:
  o the assessed experience of those plans serving the 158,000 adults with disabilities (as of 7-02) in managed care “underscore[s] the value of managed care for this population, and
  o “the existence of a coordinated care system with delineated points of contact, primary care relationships, and accountability for the integrity of that system would offer great promise to those individuals whose special needs require frequent and/or unique access to care.”

• California’s five County Organized Health Systems serve all 550,000 Medicaid recipients within a county, including people with disabilities, and are responsible for all Medicaid-covered services in those counties.\textsuperscript{76} The California Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) reported to the Legislature in February 2004 that the possible loss of COHS plans would cost the state $150M in savings to the state’s General Fund. The same LAO found that California counties with mandatory managed care enrollment for people with disabilities experienced annual costs that were 13% lower than those counties with a FFS program for recipients with disabilities in 2002-03.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{74} Aydede SK. “The Impact of Care Coordination on the Provision of Health care Services to Disabled and Chronically Ill Medicaid Enrollees,” Institute for Child Health Policy, November 2003.
\textsuperscript{75} Nolen JR. “Adults with Disabilities in Medi-Cal Managed Care: Health Plan Practices and Perspectives,” Medi-Cal Policy Institute, September 2003.
• An evaluation of Maryland’s managed care program (2001)\textsuperscript{78} revealed that overall access to care for SSI children, as well as preventive care specifically, improved following the implementation of managed care in 1997.

• A detailed analysis by The Lewin Group on behalf of the state of Texas found that “substantial savings are possible by extending Medicaid managed care to the SSI blind and disabled population.” Lewin’s report projected savings in larger metropolitan counties that ranged between 3.1 and 5.1 percent for non-dually eligible recipients with disabilities, with 60 percent of the savings achieved the first year, and an additional 10 percent reached each following year until reaching steady state in the fifth year post-implementation.\textsuperscript{79}

• An evaluation of the Wisconsin Partnership Program (WPP)\textsuperscript{80}, which integrates Medicare and Medicaid funding using a PACE-like model based in a center for independent living for people with disabilities, examined the period 1998-2000 and found:
  - enrollees with disabilities had fewer preventable hospital admissions compared to a same county non-enrolled cohort;
  - enrollees with disabilities had fewer emergency room visits than either of two control groups;
  - enrollees with disabilities had fewer preventable emergency room visits than a different county non-enrolled cohort in the 18 months after enrollment after adjustment;
  - the rate of nursing home admission was lower for WPP enrollees with disabilities than a different county non-enrolled cohort for stays greater than 30 days, and
  - the combined WPP capitation payments for enrollees with disabilities were lower than fee-for-service Medicare and Medicaid payments for the comparison group.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid, The Lewin Group.
\textsuperscript{80} Kane RL and Homyak P. “Multi State Evaluation of Dual Eligibles Demonstration: Final Report,” University of Minnesota School of Public Health, July 2004.
Evidence of the Effectiveness of Medicaid Managed Care for People with Disabilities: Behavioral Health

- An evaluation of the Massachusetts Medicaid managed behavioral health care program examined total program experience between 1990 and 1993 and found:
  - expenditures for enrollees with disabilities (child and adult combined) fell 37%, and
  - inpatient readmissions for people with disabilities fell from 25.8 to 22.7 percent, providers' reports regarding clinical quality were favorable, with the exception of for child mental health.

- Evaluations of Iowa’s Medicaid managed behavioral health care programs found the following:
  - access and utilization of substance abuse treatment increased while treatment cost per client decreased for Medicaid enrollees in the Iowa Managed Substance Abuse Care Plan (1996-1998) while cost per client dropped from $3500 to $1200. There were no apparent declines in quality, and
  - the Iowa Plan for Behavioral Health produced savings of 1.8%, maintaining and/or improving access and quality, and was evaluated as “a national leader and model program.”

- An evaluation of Nebraska’s Medicaid managed behavioral health care program examined performance from FY96 to FY98 and compared it to pre-carve-out implementation, finding:
  - the cost of care declined significantly for mental health service recipients with no appreciable impact on access or quality.

- An evaluation of Utah’s Prepaid Mental Health Plan found:
  - the quality of care declined for recipients with schizophrenia after the introduction of the program.

- Evaluations of Tennessee’s managed behavioral health care programs have had mixed findings regarding quality of care.

82 Argeriou et. al. “Evaluation of the Impact of the Iowa Managed Substance Abuse Care Plan on Substance Abuse Treatment Services,” Brandeis University.
84 Argeriou et. al. “State Substance Abuse/Mental Health Managed Care Evaluation” Brandeis University, Aug. 1, 2001.
Appendix F

Example of a Working Document from an Internal DHS Meeting with Disability Services Division Staff

Continuing Care for People with Disabilities
Summary of 3-19-04 Brainstorming Meeting

What to Cover
No strategies identified for this category.

When to Cover

Strategy #1: Reduce prescription drug waste by restricting availability of long-term prescriptions.
♦ Restrict 30-day and 90-day prescriptions when they are likely to result in waste, e.g., new medication trials that could result in allergic reaction, end of life care.

Strategy #2: Eliminate duplicative case management services.
♦ Eliminate duplicate provision of case management services.

Strategy #3: Eliminate inappropriate use of transportation services.
♦ Create restrictions on how far DHS will cover transportation service to a consumer’s choice of provider in situations in which services deemed comparable by DHS are available in nearer proximity to the consumer’s residence.
♦ Address inappropriate financial incentives and practice when a provider of day training and rehab also provides transportation and chooses to transport the consumer a longer distance than would otherwise be necessary.

Strategy #4: Eliminate duplicate payments between the waiver and the state plan.
♦ Eliminate duplicate payment of foster care and ILS between the waiver and the state plan.

How to Cover

Strategy #1: Improve delivery of preventive care services
♦ Get case managers to do a better job of addressing preventive care needs.

Other Suggestions
♦ Review rate setting practices for SLS to examine issues of potential inequity and overpayment.
Appendix G

Example of a White Paper Prepared for the Study by Bailit,
March 5, 2004

Briefing Paper
Selective Contracting for Inpatient Acute Care Services

As part of its efforts to reduce Medicaid costs without narrowing eligibility or cutting benefits, DHS has expressed interest in selective contracting as one potential strategy to pursue. This briefing paper presents background information to assist the Department in its decision-making process. This briefing paper will address selective contracting for inpatient acute care services.

Market Conditions

Underlying the strategy of selective contracting is the potentiality that not all providers able to provide desired services will receive a provider contract. It is a strategy that uses competition, bargaining power and market forces to obtain the most cost efficient price without sacrificing quality and access. Because this strategy relies on market forces, certain market conditions must be present and implications to providers considered for the strategy to be successful.87

- **Current Medicaid Rates**: Current Medicaid rates must be sufficiently above provider actual costs to encourage aggressive competitive bidding, resulting in lower rates. However, if Medicaid rates are close to the providers’ current costs, for selective contracting to be successful providers must have sufficient opportunity to lower costs through increased efficiencies. If Medicaid rates are below provider costs without many opportunities to increase efficiencies, selective contracting may exacerbate quality and access issues. In this last case, providers may either cut quality as they cut costs to continue participating in Medicaid, or they may decline to participate. Contracts awarded must provide sufficient rate payments to be attractive to providers.

- **Market Capacity**: The market area must have some excess capacity and a sufficient number of providers to promote competitive bidding. The threat of exclusion from the Medicaid program promotes competitive bidding and allows Medicaid to drive volume to the successful bidders.

- **Access**: Sufficient contracts need to be awarded to meet capacity demands for the anticipated volume and type of services needed, as well as geographic access. An insufficient number of providers may result in lower overall costs, but an access bottleneck.

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• **Patient Volume:** Contracts awarded must provide patient volume at levels to be attractive to providers. Without sufficient volume at stake, providers will not find it worth their while to participate in a selective contracting process. The potential volume “in play” must make a difference to the providers in each geographic or service market.

• **Other Payers:** If providers are likely to abandon Medicaid or shift cost to others under a competitive contacting process, obtaining the participation of all other payers (including private insurers) will reduce that possibility. By including all payers in the selective contracting process, the state has increased the volume in play for each provider, and increased the likelihood of competitive bidding to occur. It is important to note that viability of any hospital not selected would be seriously threatened.

**Political Climate**

In addition to market factors, the political climate must also be considered. Because selective contracting may result in eliminating specific providers from the Medicaid program, it is potentially a politically explosive initiative. The extent of the political impact will depend on which services are being targeted for selective contracting. For example, no states have adopted selective contracting for nursing home services, although, several have considered it.\(^88\) Texas reported that its selective contracting initiative for inpatient acute care services has been limited by political realities.\(^89\)

**Selective Contracting Approaches**

Selective contracting requires potential service providers to bid on state business. States generally use two types of selective contracting.\(^90\)

- contracts are awarded to the lowest fixed-price bid, or
- states establish price ranges plus technical requirements, such as quality measures, and award bids to either all bidders who meet price and technical requirements or to bidders with the lowest prices within the price ranges.

Rates for selective contracting may cover a broad range of services, such as primary care services, or a very focused service, such as oxygen and related respiratory services. Selective contracting may also be limited to specific geographic service areas or cover the entire state. The geographic and service scope of a selective contracting initiative would depend on the market conditions, the goals of the initiative, the level of political support and the level of resources available to implement and manage a selective contracting program.

**States’ Experiences with Selective Contracting for Inpatient Acute Care Services**

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\(^88\) *Ibid.*

\(^89\) Based on discussions with Scott Reasonover, Texas Medicaid program, on 3/2/04.

\(^90\) *Op. Cit.*
Selective contracting for inpatient acute care services is relatively rare. Only three states (California, Washington, and Texas) currently have selective contracting programs for inpatient acute care services. We were able to talk with Texas Medicaid staff extensively about their experiences with selective contracting. We believe that the Texas experience highlights both the upside and downside potential of selective contracting.

Texas\textsuperscript{91} implemented selective contracting for inpatient acute care services and inpatient behavioral health care services in 1993 and 1994 for its FFS beneficiaries. The Texas Medicaid agency contracts with hospitals in the 27 largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas. The program is implemented through negotiated discounts off of standard Medicaid rates. Texas reaped $65 million in savings (both state and federal cost savings) during the first year. The savings have declined substantially in subsequent years and is approximately $12 million for the current fiscal year. The state agency has been unable to be truly selective, limiting its ability to garner savings through this program. Selectivity has been limited by four key factors:

- CMS waiver requirements concerning access. CMS identified specific zip codes that must have hospital coverage with no travel burdens for beneficiaries. The hospitals in these areas with large Medicaid members are the large safety-net hospitals where most of the state’s Medicaid members receive care. With no likelihood of loss of Medicaid business, these hospitals have negotiated minimal to no discounts.
- Disenfranchisement of Medicaid physicians. Physicians with large Medicaid patient populations do not always have admitting privileges at the hospitals willing to give the Medicaid program negotiated discounts. Selecting these hospitals would result in significant disruption to the provider network and Medicaid members.
- Political issues. Political pressure has limited the ability of the state to decline to contract with hospitals. For example, rural hospitals, as well as having little competition, are also job centers and well protected by the state legislature.
- Recent budget cuts. With cuts to hospital reimbursement rates from other sources, including disproportionate care funds and other Medicaid program payments, Texas hospitals are unwilling to continue participating in the selective contracting program.

Within these constraints, Texas has been relatively successful in gaining significant discounts only with smaller hospitals. Even within that industry segment, it has been difficult to be selective because of the potential impact on the hospital. Not only would a non-contracted hospital lose Medicaid payments, but the hospital’s disproportionate share funds would also be dramatically reduced under the Texas formula. Not having a Medicaid contract could lead to the failure of the hospital. The Texas Medicaid agency was understandably reluctant to start that process.

\textsuperscript{91} Based on discussions with Scott Reasonover, Texas Medicaid program, on 3/2/04.
Today, Texas’ selective contracting program for inpatient acute care services is effectively “defunct,” according to the state.92 The state agency will distribute solicitation packages to all hospitals for the upcoming fiscal year, but does not expect to be very successful in negotiating discounts.

Texas realized some program savings through selective contracting. However, the Medicaid agency was not able to maintain the level of initial savings because of regulatory constraints, physician disenfranchisement, political pressure and provider resistance. Selective contracting occurs within a dynamic environment. The Texas market and political conditions required for success could not be sustained.

California’s selective contracting program for inpatient acute care services was established 21 years ago. It covers inpatient acute care services for 3 million Medi-Cal members and reimburses hospitals for services totaling $4 billion annually. When it was first established, California was extensively overbedding in most metropolitan areas according to Karin Johnson, division director for the selective contracting program.93 Therefore, the state had considerable leverage in forcing a competitive bidding process for Medi-Cal business. The Executive Director of the California Medical Assistance Commission (the Commission overseeing the program and responsible for negotiating hospital contracts), Keith Berger, believes that today it would be impossible for the state to establish a similar program.94 The hospitals are more sophisticated in their negotiating strategies and the overbedding that created a competitive marketplace no longer exists. In fact, the Commission has no hospital contracts north of Sacramento because of the lack of competition in these largely rural areas.

Over the years, the California program has evolved from one with leverage based on overbedding and selective contracting to one offering steady revenues and unique benefits to participating hospitals. The Commission has developed incentives around construction costs, ER services and special programs for county hospitals, which the hospitals consider very desirable. Also, the Commission has more flexibility than other sectors of the state government to respond to unexpected hospital financial needs. As a result, the Commission has been able to step in to provide emergency, short-term relief to hospitals. Finally, most of the participating hospitals receive a significant percentage of their revenue from Medi-Cal billings, so these hospitals cannot afford to leave the program, according to the state.95

The Texas and California experiences demonstrate the realities involved in implementing and managing selective contracting for a highly visible, albeit high cost, service.

**Conclusions and Recommendation**

92 Ibid.
93 Based on discussions with Karin Johnson, California Medi-Cal program, on 3/4/04.
94 Based on discussions with Keith Berger on, Executive Director of the California Medical Assistance Commission, on 3/4/04.
95 Ibid.
Successfully initiating a selective contracting program for inpatient acute services requires certain market conditions relating to patient volume, provider costs and capacity, Medicaid reimbursement levels and a strong political will. Even if all variables are aligned at the inception of the program, it is a difficult program to sustain over a long period of time. Several selective contracting programs appear to have evolved into a process of individually negotiated discounted hospital rates or to have been abandoned.\(^96\)

With respect to Minnesota, we do not recommend that this initiative be pursued. First, 80,000 Medicaid members located throughout the state is a relatively small amount of inpatient volume on which to build a selective contracting program. Second, approximately half of the 80,000 fee-for-service membership is dually eligible. Any selective contracting savings for inpatient services would accrue to the Medicare program.

Third, we also estimate that over half of the Minnesota fee-for-service members are disabled. This population has a higher likelihood of requiring highly specialized services, which could limit hospital de-selection options. Fourth, the benefits from selective contracting seem to diminish over time. This means that a great deal of effort and political good will are expended for a relatively short-term gain. This option to reduce inpatient costs must, therefore, be weighed against other programs. We believe that some of the other options bring considered will provide more sustained savings and member benefits.

Additional Information

**Texas’ Experience with Selective Contracting for Inpatient Behavioral Health Services**

The behavioral health selective program contracting was initially successful because it resulting in a weeding out of inappropriate hospitalizations, moving care to outpatient settings. Since its inception in the mid-1990s, the Lone Star II program has gone from 200 participating hospitals to 40 hospitals. Most of the 160 hospitals not currently under contract went out of business or were part of an industry consolidation. Texas officials believe that the market changes were more influenced by factors other than the selective contracting initiative. Between the mid-1990s and today, the focus of care moved to the outpatient setting, reducing the need for large number of mental hospitals. These hospitals also experienced reductions in reimbursement from Medicare, Medicaid and managed care programs. During this time the industry underwent major changes nationally.

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Washington

In 1988 Washington implemented a selective contracting program for primary care and inpatient acute care services in eight targeted areas. The key goals of the program are to shift all routine inpatient care from higher cost to lower cost settings, and contain overall expenditures for inpatient services. The Medicaid agency contracts with sufficient hospitals in each geographic area to provide the full range of hospital services, including specialty services. Payment is based on a pre-determined contracted rate. Excluded services include:

- emergency services
- state hospitals
- children’s hospitals
- remote hospitals, alcoholism and detoxification treatment services,
- long term acute care hospital services
- cancer research center services

Washington expected to save $10 million in 2001 and 2002. We were unsuccessful in speaking with Washington State Medicaid agency staff, so we do not know whether Washington has reached its targeted savings.

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97 “The State of Washington 19159b) program.” Available at www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/1915b/wa05fs.asp
Appendix H

List of Participants in the Commonwealth Fund Sponsored Discussion Exploring Evidence-Based Coverage as a Purchasing Strategy for Minnesota’s Medicaid Program

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Appendix I

Joint PCA Initiatives of the
Performance Measurement and Quality Initiatives Division SIRS
Section
and the Disability Services Division

SIRS and DSD have met several times and discussed the above listed problems. The following initiatives were agreed upon as a way to help reduce abusive practices:

1. **Registry:** SIRS and Provider Enrollment will be requiring all PCAs to enroll and be given an individual provider number. The PCPO will be required to report on the claim to DHS who the actual PCA is that provided the service. SIRS will then be able to identify the individual PCA that reportedly provided the service, which agencies they work for, and how many hours they reportedly worked. This will further allow SIRS to better monitor hours billed to DHS.

2. **Certification of Medical Necessity for PCA Services:** DHS will require that before PCA services can be performed and billed to the department the PCPO must be in possession of a signed certificate authorizing such service. The certificate must be completed and signed by the client’s treating medical professional. The medical professional must attest to the fact under MN Rules 9505.0174, subpart 25, and 9505.0355 that the PCA service is medically necessary. The certification must be kept in the client’s file and renewed annually. Failure to have a current certification on file may lead to the recovery by DHS of funds paid to the organization for the PCA services.

3. **Background Checks:** The PCPO must have submitted a background check for each person employed by them as a PCA prior to performing any services. Provider Enrollment will not issue an individual PCA provider number until they know a background check has been completed.

4. **Correct Billing and Charting Procedures:** DSD is exploring PCA training in the area of patient care. SIRS and Provider Relations will be exploring PCA and PCPO training in the areas of required documentation and billing procedures.
Appendix J

Example of a Working Document from a Health Care Expert Panel Meeting
February 24, 2004

DHS Health Services Expert Panel Meeting, 2-24-04
Summary of Panel Input on Strategies for the Non-disabled

What to Cover
Strategy #1: Avoid coverage of treatment that is always ineffective.
♦ Yes, this does happen. For example: single vessel CABGs, Swanz-Ganz catheters
♦ Plans don’t ask this question – they only ask whether new technology should be covered
♦ Plans use a pretty low bar when deciding what treatments to discover
♦ The FDA relies on very limited research when deciding to approve new medical devices
♦ Plans need help from DHS to make politically difficult decisions to not cover services

Strategy #2: Cover new services that will reduce overall costs.
♦ Covering phone calls and e-mail makes sense only in a capitated environment
♦ Coverage of non-physician education is intuitively attractive and consistent with disease management approaches
♦ Would make sense for smoking cessation, obesity, exercise; could work well for group visits
♦ Partner with volunteer health organizations

Strategy #3: Better define covered services so as to improve third party liability (TPL) collection
♦ Not discussed by expert panel

Strategy #4: Support infrastructure development that will result in improved care statewide.
♦ Create a commonly accessed, web-based, electronic medical record (long-term)
♦ Support use of a smart card (short-term)

Strategy #5: Apply cost/benefit testing to decide which services to cover for which conditions.
♦ There are significant cost savings for DHS in pharmacy if it adopts the practices that have been pursued by the insurers.

When to Cover
Strategy #1: Avoid coverage of services when medical evidence does not support their appropriateness.
♦ A viable strategy, but plans will need DHS to help back them up (“we’d like to have support to put structure back in”) to re-institute prior approval procedures
♦ Need a joint DHS-HMO medical policy committee
♦ Plans are currently influenced by DHS’ general practice of covering everything
♦ An easy strategy with pharmacy
♦ There is a risk of providers rebelling
♦ Examples of overused services: PCAs, UPPP instead of CPAP for sleep apnea, ER visits
♦ Alternative to re-instituting prior approval: reimburse providers less for inappropriate/overused services

How to Cover
Strategy #1: Better support the needs of the chronically ill through special care management programs.
♦ If pursuing disease management (DM), be careful and prudent and have modest expectations
♦ Needs to be tailored for DHS’ populations: “it’s not about doing it, it’s about doing it right”
♦ Already being done for PMAP
♦ Prefer building DM capacity through provider organizations rather than contracting with external vendors
♦ Believe CHF is an excellent candidate for DM

Strategy #2: Anticipate and then intercede with those who will be at high risk.
♦ Some limited expression of interest

Strategy #3: Guide consumers to higher value care using information and incentives.
♦ Believe that the economics of this strategy don’t work since DHS is a poor payer and additional patient volume would not be viewed as desirable by providers

Other Stakeholder Suggestions
♦ Address problems with continuity of eligibility
♦ Coordinate statewide immunization registries
♦ Support providers and plans to address cultural, language, and ethnic issues in treatment

Recommendations
♦ Identify cost drivers in DHS’ populations
♦ Develop a medical management plan and a medical policy committee
♦ Work with health plans to develop criteria to address overuse and waste
♦ Disease management and “StatusOne” approach
♦ Cover non-physician patient education, ER triage
Appendix K

The following pages are an example of a

Working Document from a
Stakeholder Meeting on
Potential Coverage Strategies for the Elderly
July 13, 2004
DHS Health Care Services Study: *Potential Coverage Strategies for the Elderly*

Michael Bailit
Bailit Health Purchasing, LLC
July 13, 2004

Recap: Goals of the Study

- Identify where cost savings can be realized in MA, GAMC, and MNCare. We are considering:
  - What to cover (e.g., perhaps eliminate services that add little value to members' health)?
  - When to cover (e.g., perhaps require trial of less expensive alternatives before approving a more expensive service)?
  - How to cover (e.g., perhaps use new care models to maximize effectiveness of services)?

Study Efforts to Date

- Concluded series of meetings held January to March on strategies when considering the non-disabled population.
- Concluded series of meetings held May to June on strategies when considering the disabled population.
  - One more meeting focused on gathering consumer input to be scheduled for August.
- Began meetings in June on strategies when considering the elderly population. Process concludes in August.

Profile of DHS’ Programs for the Elderly

What to Cover

1. Cover falls assessment or more general home safety assessments for senior consumers dwelling within the community.
2. Support greater use of telemedicine in rural areas and reduce unnecessary medical transportation costs.
3. Provide MSHO and MNDO coverage for pre-duals to avert nursing home admissions.

When to Cover

1. Limit the amount of case management provided when homemaker services are the only other service provided.
2. Develop clear policy direction regarding when to cover PCA, Assisted Living, and Assisted Living Plus services.
3. Move to a more objectively scored screening tool.
When to Cover

4. Create a formula that counties must use to build the budget amount for an individual consumer based on the consumer's specific needs. The budget will apply when developing a monthly payment rate for a group of services provided by one provider in a licensed setting. The formula should use DHS-defined unit rates.

When to Cover

5. Implement scheduled screenings for persons over age 65 closely following nursing facility admission (e.g., at one month and at two months) to reassess the need for nursing facility level of care and create criteria for expected discharge.

6. Create a state review team to review all nursing home admissions.

When to Cover

7. Create an audit process to catch consumer fraud whereby consumer homes would be visited unannounced.

8. Maximize Medicare and other party coverage for home health. - current strategy not effective

How to Cover

1. DHS assumes responsibility for county service contracting through either direct purchasing (e.g., current provider enrollment process) or brokered purchasing.

2. Regionalize certain county functions, e.g., licensing, contract management, transportation, information systems (this could be at state level), service oversight.

How to Cover

3. Adjust financial incentives by assigning some financial risk to counties for both nursing facilities and community-based services.

4. Enroll remaining seniors into managed care by finding a way to enroll "spend downs."

How to Cover

5. Explore daily payment limits for services delivered in one hour or 15 minutes increments.

6. Tie case management payment rates to intensity of consumer need. (Tie to larger issue of When to Cover)

7. Examine the net financial impact of pharmacy co-payments to the elderly, and the possible reduction in Rx compliance as a result of the co-payments.
How to Cover

8. Collaborate more closely with the Medicare QIO to encourage it to address risk factors that impact DHS cost (e.g., fall prevention).
9. Support efforts to improve palliative, or end-of-life, care in hospitals, consistent with the work of the MN Partnership for End-of-Life Care (e.g., modify the state guardianship law to support greater flexibility in end-of-life care).

10. Create incentives to use the consumer-directed community supports and reduce the per-person cap in exchange for increased flexibility.
11. Address problems related to polypharmacy for elders residing in the community or in non-licensed facilities (e.g., board and lodging, assisted living).

12. Make better use of community services to prevent or delay the need for nursing facility admission.
13. Require counties to compete for case management contracts.
14. Disallow counties from providing case management and home and community-based services.

15. Remove the requirement that counties contract with every provider and tighten some DHS provider enrollment requirements to balance the removal of the contracting requirement.

16. Create reportable performance standards for counties re: eligibility determination and case management (e.g., maximum case management workload limits) and create a report card to assess county performance.
   Also — create incentives for counties re: use of low-cost HCBS and county-wide availability of such services.

Next Steps

- Staff to work on strategies with the most promise.
- Specificity will be added as necessary, and cost savings estimated.
- Expert Panel to reconvene in the fall to review final draft strategies.
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### Appendix L

**Cost of Preparation of this Report**

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<th>Description</th>
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