A REPORT ON SECURITY
IN THE CAPITOL COMPLEX
AND AT THE GOVERNOR'S RESIDENCE

Issued by:
Ad Hoc Security Committee
Clinton H. Lomis, Chairman

Committee appointed by:
Richard L. Brubacher,
Commissioner of Administration
BACKGROUND

In April, 1972, Commissioner of Administration, Richard L. Brubacher, organized a special Security Committee to identify problems and develop a plan for improving security in the Capitol Complex and at the Governor's residence. The Commissioner appointed Clinton H. Lomis Chairman, and the following served on the committee:

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Department</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant Wes Paulus</td>
<td>Assistant Director</td>
<td>Capitol Complex Security Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harold H. Higgins</td>
<td>Superintendent</td>
<td>Crime Bureau, Department of Public Safety</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bert W. Johnson</td>
<td>Major, Planning &amp; Inspection</td>
<td>Highway Patrol, Department of Public Safety</td>
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<td>John C. Moen</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Plant Management, Department of Administration</td>
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<td>Donald G. Bell</td>
<td>Assistant Director, Building Operation &amp; Maintenance</td>
<td>Plant Management, Department of Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elmer L. Erkkila</td>
<td>Assistant Director, Building &amp; Grounds Services</td>
<td>Plant Management, Department of Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>George L. Kieffer</td>
<td>Director (acting)</td>
<td>Information Systems Division, Department of Administration</td>
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<td>Lloyd H. Picha</td>
<td>Draftsman</td>
<td>Architectural &amp; Engineering Div. Department of Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>F. James Erchul</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Civil Defense Division, Department of Public Safety</td>
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The committee has met regularly since formation to identify existing problems and recommend changes in the total approach to security in the Complex. Because there was no formal "sounding board" until the committee began functioning, the committee has, by necessity, handled some line-type responsibilities, and recommended procedural changes and implementation of physical improvements on an ongoing basis. However, the main objective concerned the "long pull" and strengthening the State's approach to security matters. The committee agrees the total concern must reach beyond the Complex boundaries to include the entire state. The committee thinks the Capitol Security Division should be the coordinating group that works with those responsible for security in departments outside the Complex.
Protection of the human and physical resources of Minnesota State government was central in our approach to this study. Determining the proper cost-benefit ratio is always difficult to assess, and proved to be a prime consideration as we proceeded, because almost anything can be done if cost is not a factor.

Included in this report are sections on: organization, manpower, additional manpower and vehicles, building keys and identification cards, communications, evacuation, rules and regulations, legislative coordination, Capitol Security Advisory Committee, quarters, Governor's residence, and miscellaneous items.

ORGANIZATION

As of December 21, 1972, the Deputy Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety assumed supervision of the Capitol Security Division, but a sergeant of the Highway Patrol serves in the capacity of division director. However, he does not have the official title. Several other members of the Patrol are also assigned to the Capitol Security force.

The LEAP committee assigned to the Department of Public Safety touched briefly on the Capitol Security organization and stated: "Capitol Security is now a part of Highway Patrol and utilizes some Highway Patrol personnel. By statute it was set up as a division of Public Safety but due to the urgency during the last legislative session for security and the department being new, it was integrated into Highway Patrol to expedite the functions. It is being removed from Highway Patrol and assigned to the Deputy. The activities of the Highway Patrol and Capitol Security do not relate well inasmuch as Capitol Security is a police function unlike the Patrol. Highway Patrol training is not necessarily the type of training needed for the security force. It is recommended that new job descriptions and duties be written for the security force to reclassify some of the jobs and that they receive their training from BCA's eight-week basic police training course. It is recommended that the statute be rewritten to give Capitol Security police powers. This would maximize the utilization of Highway Patrol out on the highways where they are most needed and best qualified. Additional requirements at peak periods could possibly be covered by outside services. This plan would allow for the upgrading of this function in years to come which very likely is going to need and require additional emphasis. The security of the Governor's mansion would remain as part of the function of the Highway Patrol."

As to the division organization, the committee recommends a separate Capitol Security Division headed by a director (appointed by the Commissioner of Public Safety in accordance with Minnesota Statute 299E.01, Subdivision 1.) (See next page.) To provide supervisory support, the committee recommends establishing two subordinate positions, such as Assistant Director and Supervisor of Guards (titles optional). They would report to the director.

The Assistant Director would handle delegated administrative, intelligence and investigative responsibilities, and the Supervisor of Guards would have the general line supervisory responsibilities associated with the guard force. An afternoon and night supervisor would report to the Supervisor of Guards and spend almost full time in the field.
MANPOWER

Several manpower-related aspects have to be treated individually in order to upgrade quality, improve accountability and performance, and to compete in the job market: they are, qualifications and compensation, and duties and responsibilities.

Qualifications and Compensation

The committee recognizes a general need to upgrade the security force by rewriting the job description and establishing commensurate pay levels to attract better applicants. By better applicants, the committee means the applicants who might also apply for a position in a large city police department, or highway patrol, or for a similar job in industry. (Note: See duties and responsibilities for recommendation for general guards.)

Although the committee does not recommend a specific salary level, the salary must match the qualifications and be competitive with salaries paid outside state government. Attraction of good applicants and retention of good people are necessary for good end performance. (Note: See also organization section for the LEAP statement covering this part of our recommendation.)

Duties and Responsibilities of Guard Force

The committee supports two job levels in the non-supervisory forces: police-type (1), and parking lot attendant-type (2).

The police-type (1) should receive 8 weeks formal schooling, including special investigative training, similar to that BCA agents receive. After this training, they would be certified by the Police Training Board, qualified to carry side arms and have arrest powers. They would be capable of handling almost all types of security-related matters. The committee does not recommend the police-type group for general parking lot supervision.

To handle parking lot responsibilities, the committee suggests establishing a parking lot guard classification (2). This job description should also be rewritten as necessary to attract and retain personnel who can perform capably in this position. This parking lot group should receive formal training, adequate in length and content, to get maximum performance. The pay should be commensurate with both the duties and to meet outside competition.

The committee recognizes the impact of this recommendation on the existing guard force. Although the transition period might present some scheduling and accountability problems, careful advance planning can lessen the adverse effects.
Present security classifications are: Watchman, Security Guard, Building and Grounds Security Supervisor (Faribault) and Security Supervisor (1 at Mankato and 1 at St. Paul). The advance planning necessary to move from the present classifications to the two job classifications should consider--

--Intermingling
--Phasing out
--Transfers
--Grandfathering

As stated earlier in this report, the committee thinks all new classifications should be applicable statewide.

ADDITIONAL MANPOWER AND VEHICLE REQUIREMENTS

Additions

Capitol Security has requested in their budget 22 additional positions to provide adequate 24-hour coverage of the Complex. A special subcommittee has been studying the benefits of installing a combined security-monitoring system, and has recommended to the Commissioner of Administration proceeding with the installation. If this was installed, Capitol Security estimates their manpower request could be reduced one-half or 11 positions. However, the remaining 11 positions would not provide any coverage of the power plant and Manpower Services buildings, but would cover the Health, Veterans, and 1246 University buildings.

In addition to the position reductions, the security system would eliminate guard tours of buildings, and eliminate all ADT clocks that now cost $10,000 per year.

The committee enthusiastically supports and recommends moving ahead quickly with the installation of the security system in the Capitol and Centennial Office Building, and extending it, by priorities, to other buildings. The advisory committee (see advisory committee section for detail) should set the priorities, and handle the engineering and miscellaneous items necessary for the expansion.

Vehicles

Fully-equipped and full-size Highway Patrol vehicles are not necessary for Complex use. Intermediate-size vehicles should be considered for these groups:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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<tr>
<td>Parking lot guards</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roving guards</td>
<td>4</td>
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The committee suggests considering leasing vehicles from the Department of Public Safety or the Central Motor Pool rather than purchasing them. The advisory committee should confer with those responsible and knowledgeable in this area and determine the least costly method to the Capitol Security Division.
BUILDING KEYS AND IDENTIFICATION CARDS

Keys

On August 1, 1972, the Security Committee agreed and adopted the following policy: "All internal and external key issuance and records should be responsibility of the Plant Management Division. However, requests for external and security-related area keys will first be reviewed with the Capitol Security office."

This policy and arrangement is working well, and the committee recommends adhering strictly to it to maintain an adequate access control program.

The committee recognizes some rekeying is necessary now and recommends developing a schedule to accomplish it. As the plan progresses, all departments affected should be informed. The committee recommends a June 1, 1973 completion date.

I. D. Cards

To have an effective complex-wide identification card plan only one system—under control of the Capitol Security Division—should exist. All identification card systems now being used should be changed to conform with the Complex plan but modified to meet their special needs; e.g., coding beyond that required by Capitol Security.

The committee recommends integrating the issuance of I.D. cards automatically during the employment-orientation process.

The Complex-wide identification card procedure should be developed and implemented by October 1, 1973.

COMMUNICATIONS

Good communications are an integral part of any security system to maintain efficiency, deploy manpower, and span time and distance. In addition to the installation of the backbone security system described earlier, all guards should be equipped with radios. The advisory committee should explore possibilities of LEAA (Law Enforcement Assistance Administration) funding to help underwrite costs of additional radio equipment.

The long range communications needs should be studied in light of additional physical facilities and future locations designated by the Governor as part of the Capitol Complex. The advisory committee should work closely with the Telecommunications Division in studying future radio needs.

EVACUATION PLAN

Orderly evacuation of buildings during emergency and natural disaster situations will depend on the development and implementation of a formal plan and a complete warning system.
The proposed security system adequately covers the warning system and allows for alerting individual or groups of buildings, or the entire Complex. If the system is not installed, some interim system should be developed to help with the evacuation process.

The Civil Defense Division is underway incorporating evacuation of buildings and provision of shelter as part of their Natural Disaster Plan. Because they have the responsibility and expertise in this field, this division should assume the major role in the implementation of the new plan, including training and scheduling practice alerts. Capitol Security should provide major input in recommending changes and, as necessary, actively assist in the enforcement aspects.

RULES AND REGULATIONS

No formal building rules and regulations now exist and so, nothing is posted in buildings in the Complex. Because of this, enforcement action for willful violations is difficult at best. The rules should be standardized, capable of enforcement by Capitol Security personnel, and posted in all state-owned property.

The committee urges the Department of Public Safety to proceed rapidly in developing appropriate rules and regulations, arranging for posting them statewide in the proper locations, and prosecuting violators.

LEGISLATIVE COORDINATION

To have a fully effective Complex security plan, the advisory committee should actively pursue greater interaction with legislative leaders and the staff to achieve a more coordinated effort. Further, the advisory committee should investigate supplying and supervising guards for all general-type functions for the next session. All guards assigned to the legislature should be radio-equipped.

The committee recommends the Capitol Security Division assume responsibility for total security of the Capitol, except those areas exempted by the Clerk of the House or the Secretary of the Senate.

CAPITOL SECURITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Because this is an AD HOC committee, a need exists for perpetuating some of its responsibilities. Therefore, the committee recommends establishing a permanent advisory committee. The advisory committee would have the authority to maintain a coordinated and economically-sound security program and would evaluate, recommend, and approve, security-related projects for the Complex, and ultimately statewide. Input from various individuals and from departments where expertise abides is essential in attempting to find the best solutions and developing the best policy.

The committee recommends the Deputy Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety serve as chairman of Capitol Security Advisory Committee and handle the preliminary organizational functions.

The AD HOC committee also recognizes the need for formal committee responsibilities and membership guidelines, but thinks the advisory committee should develop these after it is organized. The Commissioner of Administration and the Commissioner of Public Safety should approve these before they are finalized.
QUARTERS - COVERAGE OF SECURITY OFFICE

The Security Committee assisted in obtaining space in the Capitol for new Capitol Security quarters. The Civil Defense Emergency Operating Center's emergency generator supplies power to the center to keep it operative during outages. Because of emergency power availability and the compatibility of the proposed security-mechanical monitoring operations, the committee recommended installation of the control console in a room in the security office. When the system is installed, 5 men will be required per week to cover the console full time.

If the system is not installed, the committee recommends 24-hour, 7-days per week coverage of the security office to handle emergency calls (now answered in Capitol Rotunda after 5:00 p.m.), and support the building and roving guard force.

GOVERNOR'S RESIDENCE

As a result of a study of electronic surveillance needs, new systems are in operation and improving the effectiveness of security personnel in monitoring conditions in and around the residence.

Other recommendations concerned fences, dirveway, security office, telephone communications and gates. Work is underway to correct deficiencies identified with each of these.

Protection of the Governor and his family and residence requires definite objectives and procedures, adequate and well-trained security personnel, and other support systems and equipment.

Committee recommendations for further improvements include developing a formal set of objectives and an operations manual:

Objectives

Develop a formal set of objectives and include in the operations manual discussed later. The committee recommends objectives similar to those in use in Illinois which are shown in A-E as illustrations only.

A. To provide a maximum degree of personal security for the chief executive of the State of Illinois, his immediate family, and any and all other persons so designated.

B. To provide that security in a manner that will, insofar as possible, allow the greatest degree of privacy and freedom of movement for those involved.

C. To protect and secure the Executive Mansion, grounds, buildings, vehicles, and all State property connected thereto.

D. To provide any and all services commensurate with the stated objectives; and any and all additional services required by the chief executive or a member of his immediate family.

E. To perform all duties in a manner that will be commensurate with the high office of the chief executive of the State of Illinois, and the Illinois State Police.
Operations Manual

To assist security personnel and administrative staff personnel in defining responsibilities, the advisory committee should develop a formal manual covering all methods and procedures needed to meet the objectives listed on the preceding page. Again the contents of the Illinois manual are used as examples—subject to any revisions and additions deemed necessary by the advisory committee. Typical contents.

DEFINITIONS
TABLE OF ORGANIZATION
OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE
GENERAL SECURITY
IN-TRANSIT SECURITY
PRINCIPAL SECURITY
SPECIAL SECURITY
TELEPHONE SECURITY
POSTAL SECURITY
SERVICE SECURITY
EXECUTIVE SECURITY SECTION

Manpower

The Department of Administration should provide sufficient "handyman-type" manpower to assist the residence staff in performing miscellaneous housekeeping or kitchen staff. Security personnel should not be expected to do these tasks because each absence degrades the effectiveness of overall security.

Staffing Recommendations.

Staffing requirements will vary according to varying needs, and any changes required shall be made at the discretion of the Division Director.

All staff required at the residence are in addition to those assigned to Complex duty.

Schedule and Length of Tour

Work schedules should be posted by Tuesday of the week preceding.

Under normal conditions, the minimum tours of duty should be one year. Unusual circumstances might vary length, but should be subject to review by the Division Director with concurrence by Commissioner of Public Safety.

Assignment of Personnel

To better handle training, scheduling, equipment, supervision, coordination, recruiting, etc., the committee recommends security personnel assigned to the residence be members of the regular Capitol Security Division.

Drivers assigned to the Governor and his family should continue to be
selected from the Minnesota Highway Patrol, but the Capitol Security
Division Director should coordinate activities such as training and
assigning relief drivers, securing additional drivers, and arranging
for proper protection when the Governor is away from the residence.

By having Capitol Security Division personnel assigned to the residence,
members of the Patrol could return to their regular assignments and,
therefore, not reduce the total Patrol complement.

The committee recognizes the requirements of security personnel
assigned to the residence to have arrest powers, to carry side arms, to
have pleasing personalities, and the ability to establish effective
personal relationships without jeopardizing security, and thinks
specially selected and trained Capitol Security personnel can meet all
these requirements.

Staff Liaison

The Division Director should schedule regular, formal coordination meetings
with the residence staff and the Governor's staff to permit planning for
maximum protection and proper coverage at all times.

Supplemental Staff

To supplement the regular force group for special functions, the Division
Director, at his discretion, can draw personnel from the Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension, Highway Patrol, and other law enforcement groups.

Fire Escape

Egress during a fire from the third floor of the Mansion is all but
impossible. Even though this is a major construction project that presents
design and installation problems, the committee thinks it cannot be delayed
any longer. Planning for installation should begin immediately and a
schedule developed for its installation that minimizes interference with the
Governor's well-being and comfort.

Emergency Generator

Because of the nature of the security and supporting systems, the committee
recommends installing an emergency generator to provide power during outages.
The committee recommends the installation of an emergency generator by
August 1, 1973.

MISCELLANEOUS

Docks

Some improvements have been made in loading dock procedures in handling
incoming and outgoing shipments. Because docks are particularly vulnerable
and are critically located, the advisory committee should address itself
to further improvements in present procedures and extend Complex-wide.
Public's use of Buildings

The committee recognizes that state property is used to a large degree by the public during the day. However, better knowledge of their movements within buildings and control of access to working areas during daytime hours is essential. After hours, a "need to be there" policy should be in effect and enforced rigidly. The state must staff and provide sufficient electronic equipment to achieve this end.

Concurred In:

[Signatures and dates]